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PREFACE

This thesis has been undertaken in the belief
that it treats a comparatively unacknowledged problem ot
aesthetics.

The definition or aesthetic ugliness and the

place or the ugly in art have been largely relative to taste
and convention throughout the ages and have received little
speoifio emphasis in even the greatest aesthetic treatises.
Much of the material included in this discussion, therefore,
1s arrived at through a process ot inference.

My aim has

been to give a fairly comprehensive chronological survey ot
the topic trom the tima or the ancient Greeks through the
most recent philosophers, and to point out the need tor including the problem as a positive part or aesthetic theory
rather than treating it negatively, or not at all, as the
case has been so often.
I wish to express extreme gratitude to Dr. B.

c.

Holtzclaw for many excellent hours in his classes, and tor
his indispensable help in the preparation of this thesis.
F. G. W.
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CHAPTER I
EARLY AESTHETIC SPECULATION
1.

Socrates and Plato

"Do you not know", Socrates queries, "that with
,reterenoe to the same objects all things are both beautiful
and good?"

1

And when Aristippus asks, "Do you say, then, that
the same things may be both beautitul and ugly?", Socrates'
reply is, "Yes, undoubtedly • • • • tor whatever is good is
also beautiful, in regard to purposes for which it is well
adapted, and whatever is bad is the reverse or beautiful,
1n regard to purposes for which it is 111 adapted."

2

Pythagoras has given the oldest definition of beauty,
retleoted as recently as Croce, as "the reduction of many to one";

1. Xenophon, Memorabilia, translated by Rev. 1• s. Watson, in ·
Plato and Xenophon, Socratic Discourses, II, viii, New York,
1940,·Dutton, Everyman, p. 95.
2. Ibid., p. 95.·
3. Lockie Parker, Art and People, New York, 1934, John Day,
p. 70.

3

2

bu~

until Socrates, there is no signitioant mention ot ugli-

.

ness, either· as a real tact or as' an artistic phenomenon.
His doctrine ot utility holds some importance tor art; in the
Banquet of Xenophon, something may·be inferred from the very
·4

.

amusing scene with Critobulus,

because the judgment ot a
5
"handsome sword" or a ttfine shield" .is made with respect
I

only to the utility ot these art objects,

Although the aes-

thetic point ot view is destroyed by Socrates' denial that
beauty can exist apart from utility, insofar as his theory

is· significant, it can be easily inferred that ugliness in
art occurs at the point ot non-adaptation or mal-adaptation
ot the art-object to its peculiar end.
In Plato we find, on the one hand, a concept of

beauty, which is idealistio.

And on the other hand, there

is his concept ot art, which in being thrice removed trom
reality, is in itself an inferior thing.

There are three

main sources from which Plato's aesthetics is derived:
The

Re~ublio,

the Phaedrus, and the Philebus.

From what is

given merely in The Republic it may be said that the ugly
definitely has no place in art.

Plato \vrltes:

"Let our artists rather be those who are gifted
to discern the true nature of the beautiful
and graceful; then.will our youth dwell in a

4• Xenophon• The Banquet, translated by James Welwood, Everyman,
. .21?.• .2.U·' pp. l87-l89.
5. Ibid., P• 187.

3

6.-Plato,
Random
7• Ibid.,
a. Ibid.,
99 Ibid.,
10. Ibid.,
11. Ibid.,

The Republic, translated by B. Jowett, New York, 1941,
House, Modern Library, III, p. 105.
X, P• 371.
II, PP• 71•72.
II, PP• 72-73.
III, p. 91.
III, p. 90.

4

and this contusion and inability to·reoosnize art, qua art,
apart trom morals, is obvious in· the following passage:
nAnd we must beg Homer and the other poets
not to be angry if we strike out these and
similar passages, not because they are unpoetical, or unattractive to the popular
ear, but because the greater the poetical
charm ot them, the less are they meet tor
the ears ot boys and men • • • " 12
13

Tragedy and comedy, being imitative arts, must be
watched with particular care; some imitations are to be enoouraged and others

· 14

p~ohibited,

in the latter case the rea-

son being often that they recall sorrows and represent behavior that ought to be avoided in real lite.

15

Indeed Plato

lays great stress on the capacity of the arts directly to
atfeot and condition human behavior,
From the second source, the Phaedrus,-the notion

ot organization as a prerequisite to good art may

be found:

"But I think you will allow, that every
speech ought to be put together like a living
creature, with a body· of its own, lacking
neither head nor foot, but having both a middle
and extremities in perfect keeping with one another and the whole." 16
Bt're we get the idea of organic unity; but the approach to the problem of ugliness is quite different in the

18.
13,
14.
15.
16.

Ibid~,
Ibid~;

III; P• 83,
III, P• 94.
Ibid.; III, PP• 97-98.
lbfCI.; X, PP• 376-377.
Plato, Phaedrus~ translated by J. Wright in·Plato, Five
Dialogue~, New York, 1938, Dutton, Everyman, p. 266.

5

Philebus, where Plato's discussion of comedy is found.

We are

told that comedy is a mixed pleasure and pain of the soul's
feelings.

17

"Then our argument declares that when we laugh
at the ridiculous qualitie~ of our friends,
we mix pleasure with pain, since we mix it
with envy; for we have agreed all along that
envy is a pain of the soul, and that laughter
is a pleasure, yet these two are P.resent at
the same time on suoh occasions." 18

From this argument, Plato goes into his discussion
ot unmixed or true pleasure, trom which arises his theory ot
the purely formal and absolute beauty in circles, straight
.

.

.

lines, planes, and so forth, whose-absence is painless and
·19

whose presence is pure pleasure.

His general tendency towards the complete identifi•
cation of beauty with

~oodness,

which definition of beauty

necessarily excludes ugliness in any manifestation, is summed
up 1n the Philebus: "So now the power of the good has taken
retuge 1n the nature ot the beautiful: for measure and proportion are everywhere identified with beauty and virtue."

20

From what has beon given or a more positive sort
from the three main sources, the nature of the ugly comes.
fairly clear.

In other words, trom Plat.o's concepts of beauty,

it seems that ugliness would abide, primarily, 1n five instances:

17. Plato, Philebus, translated by·H. N. Fowler, in Plato: with
an English •rranslation, London, 1925, William He!nemann,
Loeb.· P• 331.
18. Ibid., P• 339.
19. Ibid., pp. 343•345.
20. Ibid., p. 389.

in en untruth; 1n immorality, or the depiction of 1t; in

the ungraceful; 1n the unoreanized; and 1n that which is
too complex.
2.

Aristotle

The problem ot ugliness develops and becomes better

defined with Aristotle.

Comedy and tragedy are not ugly tor

the same reasons as Plato gave, and both command a tar more
respectful treatment than at Plato's hands.

Aristotle's

closest aesthetic link with Plato is his notion ot catharsis,
which intimates a justification ot art from a moral basis.
The origins ot the art impulse Aristotle gives as impulses
to rhythm and imitation.

The problem of ugliness is more

directly concerned tvith the latter.

In the Poetics, he observes frequently with reference to imitative art, that the imitation is often agreeable
whereas the thing copied.is disagreeable, and that we may

take legitimate pleasure in seeing carefully executed pictures

ot things we do not like in reality,

This seeming oontrad1o-

t1on is possible "by our enjoyment ot the intellectual aot
and achievement involved in simply recognising the object
portrayad.n 21

21. Bernard Bosanquet, A Histor~ ot Aesthetic, London, 1922 1
George Allen and Unwln, P• a.

'I

With regard to comedy, Aristotle's position is•
as suggested, quite different from. that or Plato.

Imitation

is still the principle, but the basis ot the distinction between tragedy and comedy is the representation or higher and
\

lower types; tragedy represents men as better, and comedy,
.

22

as worse than they are in actual lite.
"Comedy is, as we have said; an imitation· ot
oharaoters of a lower type, - not; however,
in the tull sense of the word bad, the Ludicrous being merely a subdivision or the ugly.
It consists in some defect or·ugliness which
is not paintul or destructive. To talce an
obvious example, the comic mask is ugly and
distorted, but does not imply pain." 23 ,
There is then, paradoxically, a place tor the ugly;
tor the above paragraph places comedy within the ugly and
Aristotle has already spoken of comedy as falling within ·the
'

'

'

24

·.

·! .•

realm ot tine art whose essential attribute is beauty. Further
on in the Poetics, Aristotle says that it is just to censure
the introduction or irrationality and depravity of
'

25

cha~aot~~

when· there is no inner neoessit1 tor them. , Such a loophole
shows him tar more liberal than a majority ot later critics.
Following this, he says that things are censured (with reterenoe to t.he histrionic): as

impos~ibla,

as irrational, as

morally hurttul, as oontradiotory, and as contrary to art1st10

22. Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, edited with critical
23~

notes and,transiat!on bys.
Macmillan, II, p. 13•.
Ibid.,

v, ·p.

n. Butcher, London, 1925,

21 • .

24. Bosanquet; .21?,eOit.; P• 57.

25. Aristotle, .21?.•oit., XX.VI, P• 107.

8

·26

correctness,

a list which can also be applied as explanation

tor various popular judgments ot "ugly".
Ot Aristotle, Bosanquet says:
" • • • It is clear that the tasoination
ot ugliness in representative art was a
newly observed phenomenon in contradiction
with the simple assumption that the representation atteots us as does the corresponding reality. ··Not the content or the likeness,
but something, whatever it might be, involved
in the tact ot its being a likeness at all,
was thus suggested to be the secret_ot its
attraction." 27
·
I

3.

Plutarch

Throughout this early period, there is apparent

a confusion between excellence in art and.in morality, a
lack of any real distinction between aesthetics and ethics.
This confusion, evident not only in Socrates and Plato, but

also in Plutarch, Plotinus, and the Scholastics, is reflected
in the sentiment ot the Emperor Marcus Aurelius:
"Begin the morning by saying to thyself, I
shall meet with the·busybody, the ungratetul,
arrogant, deceitful; envious, unsocial. A1l
these things happen to them by reason or their
ignorance ot what is good and evil. But I • • •
28
have seen· the nature of the good that it is
beautiful, and or the bad that it is ugly • • •

26. Ibid., XXVI, PP• 107, 109.
27. Bosanquet, .QR.•.ill.• 1 p. 59.
20. Marcus Aurellus Antonius, Thoughts · ot Marcus

Aureliu~

Antonius, translated by George Long, New York, n.d.,Crowell,

P• 99.

9

Despite the \'10.n.t ot a definite line drawn between
the morally and aesthetically ugly, Plutarch brings the matter
to more ot a head by asking, "Can what is ugly in itself be
beautiful in art?

It Yes·, can the art.;.representation be suit-

able to and .consistent with its original?

It No, how does
29·
it happen that we admire such art~representations?" The a,nswer
lies 1n his Moral1a, where he says that the poets may

fabrica~e

things intentionally; and they may also try to make'us share
their own delusions by imparting things 1n false colors, things
they do not tabrioate but really believe.

In view of this,

the young .should be instructed that poetry is not greatly ·
concerned with truth.

30

He continues:

"For by its essential nature the ugly cannot
become beautiful; but the imitation, be it
concerned with what is base or with what is
good, it only it attain to the likeness, is .
commended• It, on the other hand, it produces
31
a beautiful picture of an ugly body, it tails
to give what propriety and probability requires."
The action depicted is not what we admire, but the art.

Since poetry often gives wicked experiences, youth

should not accept them as true, or.admire the actions there-

in, but should commend them "as titting and proper to the
character in hand."

32

29. Bosanquet, '.21?.·.ill• 1 p. 107.
30. Plutarch, Moralia,·translated by F. c. Babbitt, New York,
1927,·Putnam, Loeb, Vol. I, PP• 87, 91.
31• Ibid•t P• 93.
32. Ibid., P• 93.

10

"For it is not the same thing at all to imitate something beautiful and something beauti•
f'ull1, since 'beautitully' means 'fittingly
and proper11• and ugly things are 'titting .
and proper' for the ugly." 33
So Plutarch emphasized the problem barely tauohed
upon in the Poetics, making an advance over Aristotle only
in the importance which a definite question ot ugliness held
34

tor him and in the numerous illustrations which he gave.

To summarize his contribution, it ma1 be said that there is
'
some place tor the ugly in art, - though it cannot become
.

.

beautiful - because there is, as in Aristotle, a legitimate
pleasure attached to recognition, and admiration for the
artist's cunning.
Ot such a position, Bosanquet concludes: ,

" • • • To recognize a legitimate.pleasure·
in the skill that copies what is ugly, is
the germ of a recognition that what.is
apparently ugly, but admirable in art, has ·
something in it which the trained perception
can appreciate as beautiful." 35
Whether or not Bosanquat means to assert this as
Plutarch's own implication is not clear; however, such an
inference would hardly be warranted.

33. Ibid., P• · 95.

·

34. Bosanquet, .21?.•E.!l• • p. 108.
35~

Ibid., p. 108

11

4.
.

Lonsinus

,

Longinus, 1n writing on the sublime in the first
century A.D., implies many manifestations of bad or ugly
.

art.

.

He distinguishes, at the outset, the sublime and the

"h1gh•tlown", giving examples ot what he calls "turbid in
expression and contused in imagery rather than the product

ot intensity.n Such art sinks "little by little trom the
terrible into the contemptible"; and such expression even

in tragedy, which is stately and prone to bombast, is unpardonable in its tasteless tumidity.

3&

so we may ta.lee the first criterion of bad art to
be twnidity.

The second is puerility or frigidity, the

"direct antithesis.of elevation, for it is utterly low and
mean and in real truth the most ignoble vice of style."
To

these criteria we may add "unreasonable and empty passion,

where no passion is required, or immoderate, where moderation
. 37
is needed."
"All these ugly and parasitical growths
arise in literature from a single cause, that
pursuit of novelty in the expression of ideas
which may be regarded as the fashionable craze
of the day. OUr defects usually spring, for
the most part, from the same sources as our
good points. Hence, while beauties ot expression and touches ot sublimity, and charming

36. Cassius Longinus, Lonsinus on the Sublime, the Greek·text
edited after the Paris manuscript by w. Rhys Roberts,
Cambridge University Press, 1907, p. 47.
Ibid., p. 49.

12

elegances withal, are favourable to effective
composition, yet these very things are the
elements and foundation, not only of success,
but also of the contrary." 38
·

·Longinus gives the principle sources of elegant
language:

the power ot

:forming

great concepts, vehement and·

inspired passion, formation of figures of thought and expres.

.

.

39

s1on, noble diction, and dignified and elevated composition.

From these positive principles, it is easy to derive what
would be conducive to inelegance 1n the writing arts.

"The

cunning use ot figures", he continues, "is peculiarly subject
to suspicion, and produces an impression of ambush, plot,
fallacy • • • Wherefore a figure is at its best when the
very tact that it is a figure escapes attention."

40

Sublimity in speech is equivalent to a "collocation

ot members, a single one of which • • • severed from another
possesses in itself nothing remarkable, but all uni~ed to41
gether make a full and perfect organism.." ·He continues:
"There is nothing in the sphere or the sublime,
that is so lowering as a broken and agitated
movement of language • • • For all over-rhythmical writing is at once telt to be affected
and finical and wholly lacking in passion
42
owing to the monotony of its superifical polish."

3S• Ibid., p.-53.
39. Ibid.; pp. 57, 59.
40. Ibid.; p. 95. ·
41. ibid.; PP• 145, 147.
42. Ibid., p. 149.

13

That inference concerning the uglf is warranted
is denoted bf Longinus himself who says, · "For since we have

previously indicated those qualities which render a:t;yle noble
and lott1, it is evident that their opposites will tor the
43
most part make it low and base."
5.
In the third

Plotinus

centur1·A~D.,

the philosopher

Plot~us

extends the recognized province ot beauty. His position on
ugliness, too, can be gleaned, to some extent, from the following paragraph ot his Enneads:
"What, then is the primar1 boaut1 ot bodies?
There is suoh a beaut1 and it is perceived
at first sight 1 -and the soul, as being ware
ot it, calls it by name and, recognizing it,
welcomes it and is wedded to it. But if the
soul meet with the ugly, it shrinks from it
and refuses and rejects it, not consenting
with· it ••• •For everything that·1s formless, though its nature admits or form and
essential character, so long as it is devoid
ot rationality and essential character is ugly
and excluded from the divine and rational.
That is the absolutely ugly. But a thing can
also be·ugly it it be not completely mastered
by form and rationality. because its matter
does not admit ot being completely tormed in
accordance with an essential character." 44
Bosanquet, writing in terms ot Hegelian idealism

43~~

Ibid.,· p •. 155.
.
44. Plotinus, Enneads, quoted in E. F. Carritt, Philosophies
ot Beauty from Socrates to Robert Bridges: Being the sources
ot Aesthet!o Theori, Oxford university Press, 1931, p. 45.

14

and pantheism, suggests the oritioism-•that it we regard
it as detective to say that nothing is ugly, we may likewise
regard Plotinus' aesthetics as detective.

This is so because,

acoording.to what Bosanquet calls modern views ot nature, there
is nothing which does not symbolize reason in some way and to

some extent.

On the other hand, the critic maintains, it real

ugliness oan be

asserte~,

then·the idea that all is beautiful
. .

45

whioh symbolizes reason must be modified.

Plotinus has con-

tused the bare negative with the.contrary, tor nit is not
absence ot torm., but false form - confusion ot the forms ap-

propriate to different things.and meanings - in which, it
.

anywhere, we must look tor real ugliness."

46

Though it is not clear whether Plotinus is referring
to artistic as well as natural beauty, it would seem that he
talls logically in line with the torm.aliats and 1ntelleotual1sts in aesthetic theory. Most probably ugliness in an artobject would be that instance in.which 1ntellig1b111ty and
torm are lacking.
6.

Augustine.

The

Middle Ages and st. Thomas

In the following century,

45.t Bosanquet, .2J2.•.2.ll•, p, 115.
46. Ibid., P• 116.

st. Augustine, believing

15

in the existenoe ot a universal and Divine order, held that
there is no absolute ugliness.
47
de:f'ormi ty."

'

<

"Ugliness is only oomparative

Probabiy he did not refer to aesthetics but his
statements oan be applied to art; and ugliness tor the most
part vdll be round to reside 1n the taot that some things
are relativeJ..y unorganized and also in the fact that the
eyo o:f' the beholder is untrained; tor "the mutual fitness
and harmony or things cannot be perceived by souls which
are not attuned to it."

48

in the nature of things.

In any case, there is no ugliness

It is possible that a thing, not

harmoniously perceived in the first place, might make for
aesthetic ugliness in a representation - this
of the artist, himself.

or,

~n

the part

on the other hand, it might be

-t-<;

that the 8pectator•s senses, in art as in nature, are limited
in some way, and thus might cause the judgment "ugly" to what

is really aesthetically beautitul.
With the development of the Middle Ages, the first
purpose ot art is, again, that of usefulness.

This leads

to an emphasis on the building arts, and figurative art is
concerned largely with illustrations of moral doctrine and

47. Ke.therine·Everett Gilbert·and Helmut·Kuhn, A History
Esthetios; New York, 1939• N..aomillan, p. 137.
48. Ibid., pp. 137-138.

o~

16

sacred history.

49

The abhorrence or art by the medieval

ascetics is a familiar thing; .and Chambers in his History

o~

Taste says, "The rebirth of the aesthetic consciousness was
the first symptom of medieval decadence."
However, in this period,

50

st. Thomas Aquinas, echo-

ing Aristotle, sees the intellectual value of the arts.

In

his works, we can find something on ugliness and something

on the arts, but just what is the relation between the two
.

.

is not easy to determine.

There is, nevertheless, one state-

ment which gives enough of his general position to be fairly
conclusive: "An image", he writes, "is said to be beautiful
.

51

.

if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing."
This indicates an awareness of the distinction between natural and aesthetic beauty.

Further, he says, "For

beauty.includes. three conditions, intearity or perfection,
since those things which are impaired are by the very fact
ugly; due proportion or harmoni; and lastly brightness, or
olar1t1 1 whence things are called beautiful which have a
'

52

bright color ••• •"

49. Frank P. Chambers, The History of Taste: An Account of the

Revolutions,of Art critiolsm and Theory in Europe, New York,
l932,·0olumbia University Press, p. 10.
'
'
50. Ibid., p. 17.
51. st. Thomas Aquinas, SUmma Theolosica, quoted in Melvin M. ·
Rader, A Modern Book of Aesthetics: An Anthology, New York,
1935,·Columbia University Press, p. 209.
52. Ibid., pp. 208-209.

1'1

When treating the supreme modes of being,· st. Thomas
does not apeoitioally treat beauty, the gist being, evidently,
that beauty is not distinct from the other transcendentals
but falls under the category of the good.

53

'

And so, the answer

to ugliness, as to error, is deprivati.on or absence
ought to be.

~~what

.

There is nothing positive in the nature ot ug-

liness, no principle of evil, and therefore, nothing which
is wholly evil or ugly.

These things have no meaning apart

from reference to goodness and beauty, and they are caused
by them.

54

This is all written without any emphasis on artis•

tic beauty; but we may infer that, to a certain extent, such
beauty tails without the above given requirements ot clarity,
integrity, and harmony.

In any oase 1 with Plotinus, ugliness

in art, tor Aquinas would be negative, a lack rather .than any
positive quality.
This long period of aesthetics, represented first
by Augustine and then by Aquinas nine centuries later, shows
the logical development ot a system influenced by early Christianity.

Before this period, the most important criterion

ot ugliness will be found to be connected
e~hasized,

particularly, in Aristotle.

wit~

imitation, as

At first, in Socrates,

ugliness was linked w1 th the non-usetui, and then with the.

c.

D'Arcy, Thomas Aquinas, Boston, 1930, Little, Brown,
p. 140.
54. Ibid., P• 142.
53.

M~
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morally evil; but, with Aristotle, we have ugliness justified

tor realistic reasons in the representative arts; even the
morally evil justified 1n tragedy; and finally, ugliness
legitimized in comedy.

After Aristotle, then, ugliness of

topio was generally regarded as within aesthetic rights,
and the additional problem of formal ugliness began to reoei've especial emphasis with:Longinus.

To summarize, we

find that these thinkers have left us with four justifications of ugliness: realism; comedy, and the morally ugly,
perhaps; 1n tragedy; the organic notion as in Plotinus;
and the idea that the ugly is legitimate it it suocesstully

heightens the beautiful.

st. Thomas can be seen as a syn•

thesis of .Aristotle, Plotinus, and Augustine, uniting realiam.
and enlightenment.

After Aquinas in the fourteenth century A.D., there
is a surprising dearth of aesthetic material, and there is
p~actioally

no reterenoe to ugliness 1n what is extant until

Hogarth and Burke and Kames 1n the eighteenth century.

It is

a period ot artistic activity which took the torm of creation
rather than critioism and theory.

It is hoped that no signif-

icant omissions will be round; and the very general trend of
the art schools during these centuries will be taken up briefly 1n tho oonoluding summary.
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CHAPTER II
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY THnm:ERS
l. ,Burke
In 1756, Edmund Burke published his book called

A Philosophioal Inquirr into the Orisin or our Ideas of the
sublime and Beautiful. His discussion or ugliness is virtually inextricable trom his notion or the sublime.

That which

excites the strongest possible emotion is the sublime, he
says; and it includes pain, because pain is a stronger emo,

l

tion than pleasure.

,

Already, we get a hint ot romanticism.

On the nature of the experience of sublimity, he writes:

"The passion caused by the great and sublime
in nature • • • is astonishment or that state
ot the soul in which all its motions are suspended with some degree of horror. In this'
oase the mind is so entirely filled with the
2
object, that it cannot entertain any other • • •"

l. Edmund Burke, "A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin ot
our Ideas on the Sublime and Beautiful", quoted in Carritt,
..QI!..c1t., p. ea.
2. Ioid':'"; P• 89•
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The sublime is outside the beautiful and is more
closely connected with ugliness.

3

·4

as the exact opposite of beauty,
his position on beauty.

Sinoe Burke treats ugliness
it is well to indicate first

He rejects the identification of

beauty with customary or natural proportion, with utility,
5

and with perfection;

.

6

and,_conneoting it with relaxation,

suggests that it is distinguished merely by sensible qualities. -To be beautiful a thing I1D1st: (1) be small; (2) be
smooth; (3) have "variety in the direction of the parts";
(4) have parts. not angular,· but "melted as it were into each
.

.

other"s (5) be delicate and not, apparently, very strong;
(§) have clear and bright color, which is not too strong;

or it the color is glaring (7)
. '1

DDlSt

"have it diversified

with others."
Returning more specifically to the problem of the
sublime and ugly, Burke points out that we take a certain
degree of delight in the real misfortunes and pains of others,
that terror is a pleasant passion it it is not too intimately

·e

connected with ourselves.

.

Finally, he writes:

"It may, perhaps, appear like a sort ot
repetition or what we have before said,. to insist here upon the nature of ugliness, as I

3. Bosanquet, ~·~·• P• 203.
Ibid.; P• 204'.·
5. Burke; .2E.•o1t., quoted in Carritt, .2.a•oit., p. 92.
6. Ibid.; pp.~·94.
7. Ibid:., P• 929
e. Ibid., p. 89.

4~
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imagine it to be in all respecto the opposite
ot those qualities whioh we have laid down
tor the constituents ot beauty. But, though
ugliness be the opposite of beauty, it is not
the opposite to proportion and fitness; tor .
it is possible that a thing may be very ugly
with any proportions, and with a perteot titnoss to any uses. Ugliness I imagine likewise
to be consistent enough with an idea ot the
sublime; but. I would by no means insinuate
that ugliness, of 1taelt, is a sublime idea,
unless united with such qualities as excite
a strong ter~or." 9

It almost seems that, in Burke, we have.a new type
ot ugliness.
ne~s

Are we to inter trom his discussion that ugli-

is redeemed by a pleasurable condition ot the passions -

passions, in a stronger sense
ta~ion?

t~an

has

beto~e

been the

. At any rate, this connection ot ugliness with

c~nno
t~e

stimulation ot the passions seems to foreshadow the Dionysian
aesthetics of Nietzsche. ·
·2.

Baumgarten

About mid-eighteenth century, the German rational•

1st. A. G. Baumgarten, sought to establish an independent
science tor the theory of the imagination,
'11

Leibnizian tradition to it,

'

10

applied the

and ·called it "aesthetics."

9. Edmund Burke, A Philoaophical Inguiry into the Origin of our
Ideas of the Subliliie and Beautiful, New York, 1860, Harpers,.
P• 150.
10~ Gilbcrt·and Kuhn; .!!e.•.2..!l•t P• 290.
11• carritt• .21?.·~·• p. 81.
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Beyond this nominal contribution, his work is of slight importance.
He places the fine arts in the realm of lower ap-

prehansion, that realm of vivid but confused imagery.

12

"Clear

or vivid ideas", he writes, "are more poetical than obscure
or faint ones."

13

But, he continues, it is only contused

(sensuous) but vivid ideas which are poetical since distinct
ideas are not sensuous, and therefore not poetical.

Although

this, at first, has the appearance of being contradictory,
the paradox may be removed by Baumgarten•s distinction between
clear and distinct, though it is not certain at all what this
distinction is•
"Passions are notable degrees of pleasure or
pain; oonsequently such feelings are presented,
to the man who is apprehending something, as
confused or sensuous ideas or good and evil.
Consequently they afford poetical ideas - and it
is poetical to arouse passions." 14
Without much originality, he gives art the function
of imitating nature, adding that it must not combine oontradietary elements.

15

,The unity of art, as he speaks of it,

means a "function of the togetherness of emotional and pictured
lG
units."
Since beauty is tor hi~ a formal principle of unity
in variety, that which opposes the perfection of tho variety

12. Gilbert an? Kuhn, .21?.•cit., p. 292.
13. Bau.mgarten, Fhilosoph'I'C'al thoughts on matters connected
with Poetry, quoted in Carritt, op.cit., p. 82.
14. Ibid., p. 82.
15. Gilbert and Kuhn, .21?.•.2.!i•• p. 293.
16. Ibid •• p. 295.
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ot parts within a sensuously perceived whole, is ugly.

18
sensuous knowledge, to be avoided, is ugliness."
.
Among his writings, there are several pertinent

"The detect
'

17

or

statements:
"The appeararioe of perfection, or perfection
obvious to taste in the wide sense, is beauty;
the corresponding imperf action is ugliness.
Hence beauty, as such, delights the observer;
ugliness, as such, is disgusting." 19
"Ugly things, as such, may be thought or in a
beautiful way, and more beautiful things in
an ugly way." 20
'

Although this last sentence seems to indicate a
possible opening for ugliness in art, his aesthetics do not
add up to give any clear statement of his position on that
'

matter.

Does his "thoughtof in a beautiful way" give a clue?

Possibly, it may mean a certain way in which the imagination
and emotions are stimulated.

The most that can be said posi-

tively is that aesthetic ugliness would result from an imitative combining ot contradictory elements of nature, and from
the destruction of the aforesaid formal principle.

It seems

that, insofar as the form of the art-objeot is concerned, there
is no excuse for ugliness; but with regard to subject matter,
there remains an open question.

At least, Baumgarten seems

to be beginning to emphasize the imagination and the necessary

17.
18.
19.
20.

Bosanquet, .21?.•cit., p. 185.
Baumgarten, Aeathetics, quoted in Carritt, ..op...c.1.:t., p. 84.
Baumgarten, ~etaphysics, quoted ibid., p. 84.
Baumgarten, Aesthetics, quoted ibid., p. 84.
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capacity ot art to stimulate it.

However indefinite his

theory is, it is a definite departure from the classical and
medieval traditions.

3.

Kant

The properties of pure beauty,

we

learn from Kant,.

concern design, disinterested and universal pleasure, harmonious interplay of reason and sense, and non-purposive purpose.
Kant•s entire aesthetics, which is influenced noticeably by
Burke, is too long to be of much use in this more strictly
defined problem.

However, below are several citations which,

in indicating a rather relativistic stand, may intimate something of his attitude towards the ugly:
"So there can be no rule by which anybody can
be compelled to recognize anything as beautiful." 21
" •• (B)eauty, apart from relation to our
reeling, is itself nothing ••• " 22.
"There can be no objective rule of taste to
determine by conceptions what is to be beautiful • • • " 23
The only claim to universality of agreement in judging
24
beauty is that the beautiful is a symbol of the morally good.

21. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, quoted ibid., p. 112.

22. Ibid., p. 113.
23. Ibid., p. 117.
24. Ibid., p. 123.
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His attitude towards the sublime is particularly
interesting and can be traced directly back to Burke.

What

are here the very chaotic qualities of feeling in experiencing
the sublime, have been, 1n other aesthetic theories, qualities
sometimes attached to judgments _of ugliness. In the

~ublime,

Kant says, we may have a form which is badly titted to judgment, unsuited to our perceptual powers, and even violent to
our imagination.

25

More definitely with regard to the problem ot ugli•
ness•in art is the following citation, quoted in full because
it seems to summarize rather completely Kant's position.
"Where tine art evidences its superiority
is in.the beautiful descriptions it gives of
things that in nature would be ugly or displeasing. The Furies, diseases, devastations
of war, and the like, can (as evils) be very
beautifully described, nay even represented in
pictures. One kind of ugliness alone is incapable of being represented oontormably to-nature
without destroying all aesthetic delight, and
consequently artistic beauty, namely, that which
excites dis6(ist. For, as in this strange sensation, which opends purely on the imagination,
the object is represented as insisting, as it
were, upon our enjoying it, while we still set
our face against it, the artificial representation of the object is no longer distinguishable
from the nature of the object itself in our sensation, and so it cannot possibly be regarded
as beautiful. The art of sculpture, again, since
in its products art is almost contused with nature,
has excluded from its creations the direct representation of ugly objects, and instead only sanctions, tor example, the representation of death
(in a beautiful genius), or of the warlike spirit
(in Mars), by means of an allegory, or attributes

25. Ibid., p. 118.

26

which wear a pleasant guise, and so·only indirectly, through an interpretation on the
part of reason, and not for the pure aesthetic
Judgement." 26
Kant represents an advance in that we have an even
wider and more definite inclusion - ugliness is legitimate
so far as it stimulates the imagination except in the case
of disgust.
4.

Schiller

Friedrich Schiller is best known for his doctrines
of aesthetic semblance and the play-impulse.

Called the link

between Kant and Goethe, he was, aesthetically speaking,
less subjective than Kant, and more

absoluti~t

oonoerning

the beautiful.
In that period of his aesthetic theory which may

be regarded as pre-Kantian, he was a moralist.

Perfection

depended upon harmony and proportion; wrong action was discord and imperfection; in short, like the ancients, he 1dent1tied truth, goodness, and beauty.

27

Atter this pre-Kantian stage, he asserted that the

aim of art was not morality but "free pleam:are";

28

and that

26. Immanuel Kant, Critique or Aesthetic Judgment, translated
by James C. Meredith, Oxt'ord, l9ll, Clarendon Press, PP• 173·
174. .
'
.
27. Calvin Thom.as. The Life and Works of Friedrich Schiller,
New York, 1906, Henry Holt, p. 265.
28. Ibid., P• 266.

27

art's only moral value was that it stood on neutral territory.
29

That is bad art which 1ntluenoes a course ot action. ·
"The unique secret

of

art • • • is to subliiD.e.te the

30

matter by the torm", he wrote. . The beautitul is composed ot
two elements:- "first the sensuous pleasure caused by the play

ot personality, and secondly the rational gratification caused
by the idea ot adaptation to an end • • • "

31

In art, the

object must be "idealized"; but this process does not mean
beautified, - rather it means truthtully portrayed.

For,

tinally 1 true hwna.n nature is never anything except noble.

32

In his.aesthetics, Schiller devoted a good deal ot

space to the question of the pleasure telt over painful representations, :from which discussions a possible clue to ugliness
may be derived.

"All pleasure • • • comes from the perception
ot ••• the quality of being adapted to the
furtherance ot an end. Since man is meant to
be happy an~ naturally seeks happiness, human
suttering affects us primarily as a 'maladaptation •, and so gives us pain. But in this very
pain our reason recognizes a higher 'adaptation•,
since we are incited by it to activity. We know
that it is good tor'us and tor society; and so
we take pleasure in our own pain. The total etteot ot tragedy depends upon the proportion in
33
which this higher sense of adaptation is present."

29. Ibid., P• 282.
30.

31.
32.

33.

·

Sohlller, Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind,
quoted in carritt 1 .QQ..clt., P• 127.
Thomas, .21?.•.ill•, p.276.
Ibid. 1 p. 287. Ibid., p. 267.
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But "beauty," he says, "can tolerate nothing abrupt ,

or violent."

34

It 1s possible to infer from hie writings what

else would be bad art, or probably ugly.

Passionate art is
35
bad, as 1s any art which 1e "didactic or ed1ty1ng." With

resnrd to subject matter. it seems correct to say that eo
long as "idealized", or truthfully portrayed, anything ls
beautiful and nothing ugly.
Although it is possible to indicate a rather direct

line 1n the general theoretical positions of Baumgarten, ,Burke,
Md Kant w! th their emphasis on the imagination and their ,.

consequent tendency towards romant1o1sm, Schiller is not easily
placed 1n this lino.
any

In the above respects, he does not make ··

advance nor does ha even stay

\11th

those thinkers 1n

their advances when he says that passionate art is not good
although ho does leave room tor tragedy.

r

Perhaps his position

is to mark the beginnings or aesthetic idealism. so prominent

in the German thinkers ot tho next century.

M. ttenry Rutgers Marshall, The noautiful, London, 1924,
ttacmillan, P• 192.
35. sobiller, 9.l?.•.2!l• • quoted in Co.rritt, .2.ll•SU•, P• 127.
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CHAPTER III
GERMAN IDEALISM OF THE 'NINETEENTH CENTURY
1.

Schelling and Hagel

Sohelling was younger than Hegel, but he was well
known before Hegel began to come into prominence; and it is
to Schelling that Hegel's aesthetics owes a fundamental debt.
In his Aesthetics, Hegel says that with Schelling " • • • the

actual notion ot art and its place in scientific theory were
.

1

discovered."
Schelling is important to our particular problem

.

.

"

only indirectly, tor ho had little to say concerning the ugly
in definite terms.

One reference can be found in which he

speaks of the old view ot art.

This old conception ot imitat-

ing nature, be writes, gives no explanation of how the beautiful, which is to be imitated, differs from the ugly, which is
not.

The trouble lies "in regarding Nature as a lifeless
.

aggregate ot objects";

2

and the problem of imitation can be

l~· Hegel, Aesthetics,· quoted in Bosanquet, op.cit., p. 135.
2. Bosanquet, .21?.•clt., p. 327.
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overoome if nature is regarded as a whole, as an expression

In art, given form must be transcended

of rational power.

and restored as intuited.

3

"Henoe the soulptor or the painter

who represents nature has to undo in his own mind the separation effected by human consciousness.

He reverts to a sub-

conscious stratum whera man and nature are one."

4

Sohelling, himself, writes concerning this:
"The artist must strive to emulate that
real spirit of Nature which speaks from within things, and uses their shape and form as
its mere sensuous symbols ••• Definition ot
form in nature is never merely negative or _
formal, it always has positive character." 5
Here he catches up Plotinus a little, only for
Schelling anything is beautiful from the standpoint of the
whole, where, for Plotinus, there remained some things which
could not be mastered by form and rationality.
Schelling also emphasized the "characteristic",
and after him Schlegel, Sohasler, and Hartmann; but Schelling's
definitions and use ot the term has somo inoonsistenoy.
The most direct reterenoe to our problem is found

in the tollowing statement:
"Now the infinite represented in tinite
form is Beauty. The· fundamental oharaoter
ot every work ot art, which comprehends in
it the two former characters ••• is therefore Beauty, and without be,auty there is no
work of art." 6
3. Ibid., p. 328.
4. Gilbert and Kuhn,

.QI?.•ill.•, p. 433.
5. Schelling, The Relation of the Arts of Form to Nature,
quoted in Carrltt, .QI?.•ili•, P• 136.
6. Schelling; System of Transcendental Idealism, quoted in
Bosanquet, .21?.. 2.ll• , pp. 319-320.
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" • • • Art••, wrote Regal, "has the ttmotion ot
revealing truth in the form of sensuous artistic shapes and

ot presenting to us the recono111at1on or the contradiotion.

(between sense and reason, between v.1lat is and what ought
to be, between desire nnd duty)."

'1

For Hegel, art transoenda the useful and seeks '
the beautitul, tho degree ot beauty attached to a thing
depending upon tho degree to which 1t is symptomatic or the

presence ot spirit. There is no systematic

treati.~ent

ot

ugliness; but in his discussion of tho beauty and ugliness

ot onimals, Hegel seems to admit a relativistic position
by say1ng that oertnin creaturoa seem ugly to us because
their torms are opposed to what we have been trained to consider adequate expressions ot life.

This may be taken to

'implf that below man and art. ugliness is not absolute.

a

However, Ugliness (in art?) alwnys seams to involve a d1ator-

ti on.

"False oharaoterisation seems then to be the essence

ot ugliness • • • "

9

Although, as mentioned, Hegel nevor treats the ugly
as a distinct and definite problem, there are

sev~ral

reter-

ences in h1s philosophy from which it is possible to derive

aone idea or b1s stand.

Kidney, reproducing his Aesthetics

1ns1mpl1f1ed tom, writes:

'1. Hegel, Aesthetics, quoted in Ca.rr1tt, .21?_.oit., PP• 163-164.
Bosanquet, £?.:2.eOit., P• 338.
9. Ibid., P• 3o5.

a.
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"The grand motive principles in Art are
the principles ot religion and morality; of
the family; the state, the Church; of glory,
friendship, eto.; and particularly in Romantic
Art; ot honor and love. These principles d1f•
fer, without doubt, in the degree of their
moral worth! but all participate in rationality.
There are, ndeed, other potencies which are
opposed to these legitimate ones, the potencies
or evil 'Or the negative principle; but that
which is purely negative cannot appear in the
ideal representation of action as the essential
cause or the reaction,.. The end or evil is something null, and the contradiction or this, as
an originating principle, does not allow of a
beauty puro in its forni. Cruelty, 'Wretchedness,
violence, are allowable in a representation
only when they are allevia te.d by the grandeur
ot the character; and the end he has in view.
Parversity,·envy, baseness, a.re only repulsive. •"
"(Art can only make wicked characters interesting by letting be soon in them the evidence
or the possibility of something good, thus an
inward collision· • • • )" 10
Unlike the earlier aesthetioians, truth in art, tor
Hegel• does not necessarily imply a faithful imitation ot
nature; rather, art flatters nature.

11

Works of art should

be immediately enjoyed, causing no bewilderment and demanding
no erudition on the part

for the artist to go out

or
or

.

12

the spectator.

.

It is unsound

his way after the bizarre and

startling, or to try too hard to at"tain humor.

13

The following paragraph seems rather sigriifioant:

10. John steintort Kidney, Hegel's Aesthetios: A Critical

Exposition, Chicago, 1885,
U• Ibid., p. 54.
l2• Ibid. 1 p • 94.
l3. Ibfii., p • ll3.

s. c. Griggs, p. 69.
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" ••• (I)t in an artistic performance anything is borrowed from the· ideal or the ulti•
mate perfection, it may be, it adequately
rendered, said to belong to High Art. If it
deals with what has no permanence, or intrinsic worth, it is low 1n its aim, and can only
be rescued from speedy neglect by its success
in dealing with the mystery of Color or of
14
Sound, or appealing to some transient sympathy."

In his discussion or styles, Hegel lists the severe,
the ideal, and the graoetul.

With the latter, he remarks,

architecture, painting, and sculpture are often not content,
unless they cover up simple and grand masses with much detail
• 1.e. "style for effect"• which includes shocking and severe
15
and striking contrasts.
There seems a possible place tor ugliness in the
tine arts with regard to the

aspeo~

of characterization •.

For the demand, here, is not so much for physical perfection
as tor moral consciousness shown through even ugly figures.
"The painter;1nay, by the inner beauty of the soul, glorify
16

the ungainly body."

.

so, in portraiture, the

~mphas1s

is

always upon the inner character.
From the foregoing we may summarize to the etteot
that ugliness in nature may be relative; that art is bad
where it is too esoteric or didactic or startling, that ugliness has a place in art only as somehtnr connected with beauty,

14.

Ibid~t

P• 177.

15. Ibia.; P• 184.
16. "ib!d., P• 242.

and that supert1o1al physical ugliness can indeed be artisti•
oally alleviated by the presence of spiritual beauty.. In
short,. real.ugliness is false characterization; what is commonly called ugly can be redeemed and;, it 1t is., is aesthetically legitimate.
. 2.

Schopenhauer

It would seem that, where in his pessimistic
philosophy Schopenhauer regards pleasure, not as positive,
17
.
but a ~uspense ot pain,
that beauty might be only a negative suspense ot ugliness.

However, such is not the case

at all; for, surprisingly enough, there is no real ugliness
for him, as there was none for Schelling.
"When we say that a thing is beautiful,
we thereby assert that it is an object or
our aesthetic contemplation •• •" 18
"Since, on the one hand, every given thing
may be observed in a purely objective manner
and apart from· all relations; and since, on
the other hand, the will manifests itself in
everything at some grade of its objectivity,
so that everything is the expression or an ·
Idea; it follows that everything is also
·beautiful , • •" 19
The only difference between art and nature is that,

1'1, Gilbert and Kuhn, .21?.•E.!1•, p, 466.
18 • Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, quoted in Carritt,

.2l?,eC1t., P• 144.
19. Ibi<r.; p. 145•
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in the former,

W<:'

have the artist's eyes to look tru::ough.

20

In his discussion of the 'separate arts, we learn that music

1s set aside as a copy of the will itself and that imitative
21
music is entirely to be rejected•
As to types and modifications of bf'tauty:
"The sublime is the same as the beautiful,
except that it presupposes a hostile relation
between the objects contemplated and the individual will, which hostility, being overcome by an effort, gives rise to a spiritual
exaltation or the subject in attaining, by
this special ertort, the pure contemplation
ot the idea in the hostile object." 22
From Schopenhauer we can only find that ugliness
is not absolute but entirely relative, that it is merely a
defective manifestation or incomplete objeotitioation or the
23
.
will,
and that the tact of its being an objeot1f1oat1on
of the will always is what saves a thing from being ugly.
3.

Schlegel

Friedrich Sohlegel's main contribution to the signitioance of the ugly .1s, circuitously, through the emphasis
Which he places upon the "characteristic" as art'e'pr1nc1ple.

24

Bosanquet, £P. •.Q.!.l., p. 365.
21• Ibid•, p• 367.
22. Ibid.; P• 356.

20~

23. Ibid., P• 366. ·

24. Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic As Soience of Expression and
General Lin~istio, translated by Douglas Ainslie, London,
1922, MaomI lan, p. 347.
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He began with an

:~~tithesis

ot beauty and ugliness.

Intend-

ing to keep ugiiness entirely outside the province of the
beautitul, he finds that it inevitably pushes its

~uy

in.

25

He may be considered im:portant, in a nominal way such as

Baumgarten, tor giving the first mention in aesthetical history ot a "theory of ugliness."

26

Beauty is defined as "the,

pleasant manifestation or the good"; and ugliness, as "the
unpleasant manifestation ot the bad."

27

Are we to suppose

from this, asks Dosanquet, that an,unpleasant manifestation
of the good and a pleasant manifestation of the bad are impossible?

Bosanquet points out that Schlegel, regarding

ugliness as the embodied negation ot beauty, finds his concept difficult to handle and eventually realizes and admits
that the most intense, positive ugliness will always contain
elements .of beauty.

28

Croce, in llia Aesthetic, discusses (and rejects)
two doctrines which were in development during this period
of German aesthetics.

The first, the "sympathetic" doctrine,

sought to set the problem of giving a place to the ugly.
"This problem",

C~ooe

writes, "is without meaning tor us,

who do not recognize any ugliness save the anti-aesthetic
or inexpressive, which can never .form part of the.aesthetic

25. Bosanquet, .2l?.•..2i!•• P• 394.
26. Ibid., P• 301.
27. Soh!ogel,·quoted in Bosnnquet, p. 301.
28. Bosanquet, .Ql?..oit., P• 301.
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faot, being, on

th~

contrary, its antithesis."

29

He goos

on to say that this school ot thought asserts that the ugly
or "antipatheticn is admissable 1n artistic representation

only when it can be overcome.

It excludes trom art invin-

cible ugliness auoh as the disgusting and nauseating..

The·

duty of suoh ugliness as is admitted to art,1s to heighten
the beautiful by contrast.

"Thus the ugly in art was looked

upon as adapted·for the service of tho beautiful, a stimulent
'

and condiment of aesthetic pleasure."

30

This overcoming ot

the Ugly School thinks of the oomio, sublime, tragic, and
such types, as conflicts between ugliness and beauty, where

..

beauty wins and, because of its struggle, arises the loftier

and the greater for it.

31

This theory, presupposing that of Schlegel, alre·ady
outlined, and the second doctrine (ot the passage

or

beauty

from the abstraott partioularized 1n the comic, tragic, and
so forth, to the oonorote), is seen in certain minor aestheti.

.

.
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cians • Solger, Weisse, and Ruge.

4.

Solger and guse

For Bolger, tragedy and oomedy lie within the

.91?.•.2.!!•t P• ea.
30. Ibid., P• aa.
51. Ibid.a P• 346
32. fbid •• pp. 346-547.

29. Crooo,

beautitul.

"TraE·~:n;v

is the

t

idea• as emphasized by ann1h1- ..

lation of it • • • "; and "Comedy is the idea recognized as
asserting itself throughout even the most oommonplaoe existenoe."

33

If comedy ceases to.be recognized in the realm.

of common life, we have one ot two results: either the prosaic view of life not connected with aesthetic feeling; or
olse, we have ugliness rising "when the human mind finds in
the commonplace phenomenon • • • something essential* wherein the phenomenon, divorced from the idea, has independent
reality."

34

Solger•s rather extreme position is given in the
citations below:
"If anything is to be recognized as the
opposite of the beautitul, the same
must be looked for in it tha=e-iS""I"Ooke ·or
in the beautiful, and the()j)poSite found-::11 the Idea Is really lacking, and the mere
phenomenon gives itself out for the essence,
then the ugly makes its appearance. The ugl1
is a rebellion against the beautiful, as the
evil against the good • • • Natural im:perfeotions are not ugly, except in so tar as in this
complication of external forces something is
taken to reveal itself which aims at concentrating these mere torces as essential 1n themselves • • • Just so, a disposition which opposes itself to.the beautiful by concentrating
the aommonplace into a single point, and acquiescing therein, is an ugl1 disposition.
Mere contingency and maladaptation, therefore,
are not enough to constitute ugliness; .it is
necessary in addition that in the things which

thanf

33. Solger,·Vorlesungen ubar Aesthetik 1 quoted in Bosanquet,
· :m,.cit. 1 P• 3\15.
34. Ibicr.; P• 396.

39

are thus self-contradictory there shall be
a unity, which (really) could only b& the
idea, but is sought tor in purely phenomenal
existence • • •
"The ugly is therefore positively opposed
to the beautiful, and we can only regard them
as absolutely exclusive of each other." 36
The conclusion is that the ugly, qua ugly, cannot
enter art; and ·yet beauty in its progress from the sublime
to the comic comes close to ugliness and is saved only by
the strong ideal vlhich generates true comedy.
not deep is ugly.

36

Art that is

The ·superricial, the "purely phenomenal"

are ugly; art must, as with Hegel at the beginning of this

idealistic strain, reveal a profound spiritual meaning.
Arnold Ruge's aesthetics also focuses on the idea
37
of ·the comic. It is well to note that in all these German
thinkers, subsequent to Hegel 1 the use of the Idea is a
prominent feature

or

aesthetic theory.

In Ruge, for instance:

"(T)he effort to achieve the Idea, or the
Idea searching tor itself, generates the sublime;
when· the Idea loses instead of discovering itself, ugliness is produced; when the Idea redisoove~s itself and rises out o~ ugliness to
new lite, the oor.tl.o." 38

5. Weisse, Sohasler, Hartmann
Where the foregoing thinkers have been skeptical

35. Ibid., PP• 396-397•

.21?.•..2!:!=.•• P• 397.
37. Gilbert and Kuhn, .21?.•Eli•, P• 454.
38. Croce, .21?.•.2!!•• p. 347,

36. llosanquet,

40

in varying degrees about the place of ugliness in art,
Weisse, Sohasler, and Hartmann assign it a legitimate place
and regard an independent existence of ugliness as an aes-

thetic possibility.
For Weisse, ugliness

is~'the

immediate existence

of beauty' which is overcome in the sublime and the comic."

39

lle not only insists in claiming a plaoe for the ugly in aes-

thetic theory; but he also insists that positive ugliness,
as differentiated from defective beauty, can claim a place
for itself in art and has a power not U.nlike that of the
beautiful.

He brings the ugly, according to the theories

discussed, into the progress of beauty from sublimity
comedy, through the self-oonfliots of beauty.

40

to

Though Sohasler recognizes an invincible ugliness,
he also regards the type of ugliness whioh Weisse calls
"positive" as legitimate aesthetic material.

Further, he

says that ugliness is an essential element of all beauty and
"is the active element or dialectic negation by which aesthetic
interest is impelled to the creation ot definite or character.
41
istio beauty, in its various forms."
So it is evident that,
like Schlegel, Sohasler gives the "characteristic" a central

place in art.

42

39• Ibicl. t ·p. · 346•

·

40. Dosanquet, ~·ill.·• PP• 398-399.
41. Ibid., P• 417.
42.

Ibid., p• 41S.
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He disagrees with those who hold that ugliness,
entering art, must remain ugly.

He seems always

to keep

in

mind masculine and teminine beauty and "points out that the
oharaoteristio qualities or features or either sex, it transferred ;!,! primarl characteristics to the other sex, would at
. 43

once become ugly."
"The beauty of art passes over into ugli- ·
ness either by a contusion between two phases
of beauty such as the sublime and the graoetul, or by the intensitioation of some oharaoteristio till it destroys the harmony ot the
system to which it.belongs and becomes caricature. Thus the monstrous or horrible is the
false sublime, and so on. such are the points
at which the la~ent ugliness within art passes
into actual arid invincible ugliness outside
art." 44
Eduard von Hartmann is like Sohasler in two respects;
he emphasizes the characteristic and he says that ugliness is
always an element in beauty. All ugliness is relative in that
45
it is "apparent." There is real ugliness in nature, he says,
46

tor nature does not always aim at beauty;

.

and

we

may cer-

tainly inf er that whatever ugliness there is in nature is
mixed

with beauty.

But as tor art:

"Ugliness is just.so tar aesthetically
justified as it is a vehicle of the concre. tion of the beautitul."

43~ Ibi~~-

pp. 417-418.

44. Ibid., pp. :418-419.
45 •. Ibid., P• 432.
-

46. Ibid., PP• 429•430•.

42

ttThe more characteristic any beauty is
upon its own level! the more serious are the
forte! tures which t imposes on the beauty
ot lower levels; that is, within every grade
the formal ugliness which is aesthetically
indispensable is the greater as the beauty
is more characteristic." 47
6•

Rosenkranz

Karl Rosenkranz "brought into relief the esthetio

relevance of the ugly as the 'salt-destruction of the beaut!•
tul~'"

46

Though he is not chronologically last in this group

ot German thinkers, he is left here until last, because his
is the most concrete language we have yet heard concerning

the ugly in art.

In 1853 1 he published a volume called

!!!!.

Aesthetic ot the Uslt, in which he posits ugliness midway

between the beauti:tu.l and the comic. He opposes the idea
ot ugliness as a foil to beauty in art.
t'(He) justifies its introduction by the
necessity for art to represent the entire
appearance of the Idea; on the other hand
he admits that the ugly is not on the same
level as the beautitul, for, if the beautiful can stand by itself alone, the other
cannot do so and must al\va.ys be reflected
by and in the beautiful•" 49

Though Bosanquet doubts that ugliness as a positive
negation of beauty oan be idealized without being undone sua

47. Hartmann, Aesthetics,, quoted in Bosanquet,
48. Gilbert and Kuhn, .QE.•.£ll•• P• 454.
49. Croce, .21?.•oit., pp. 34'1-348.

P,~

432.

43

ugly and given as beauty, this is precisely what Rosenkranz
proposes.

In art, ugliness must not be beautiful tor this

would add "fraud to rebellion.'' The process of idealization,
in which ugliness is subjected to the laws ot beauty, will
not, Rosenkranz thinks contrary to Bosanquet, hide its ugli•
ness, but will accent its "characteristic lineaments" and
at the same time do away with unessential and unpleasant
detail.

50

Ugliness is a distinct "objeot-matter 0 outside
the,beautitul and does deserve separate treatment.

Ugli-

ness, as such, is the negation ot beauty; that·is, it is
'

'

a perversion ot that which gives rise to beauty.
therefore, beauty and ugliness contain the

same

Since,
ta.ctors,

ugliness can be subordinated to beauty 1n an aesthetic experience ot a complex type such as comedy, which will not
be a species ot the beautiful but a

0

oont1nuation of its

principle in a new shape, after the rebellion of the ugly
51
has been overcome."
Because Rosenkranz was the first to recognize
seriously and devote an entire volume to the problem of the
ugly, an important paragraph from his work is quoted in full:
"It art is not to represent the idea in
a merely onesided way; it cannot dispense
with the ugly. The pure ideals exhibit to

50. Bosanquet, ~·..2.!!•, P• 405.

51. Ibid., p.·401.
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us no doubt the most important. that is, the
positive element of the beautiful; but if
mind and nature are to be admitted to presentation- in their fuli drama.tic depth, then the
ugly ot nature, and the evil and-diabolic,
must not be omitted. The Greeks, however much
they lived in the ideal, had nevertheless their
Hekatoncheires, Cyclopes, satyrs, Graiae, Empusae, Harpies, Chimaoras; they had a lame god,
and represented in their tragedies the most
horrible crimes (e•G• in the Oedipus and the
Oreste1a) 9 madness (in the Ajax), nauseating
diseases \in
the Philoctetes), and in their
comedy, vices and infamies ot all kinds• Moreover,
with the Christian religion! as
that w oh,teaoheS'I!ion to know evil iii tS-root
and overcome It :rundruiientallz, the uflyis
1Iiially ~ in princilie introduced nto the
world of art. For th s reason theretore,-rri
order t'Odepiot the concrete ro.anlfestatfon ot
the Idea In its totality, art cannot omit the
f>Ftrayal of the uqy. ~ alprehension ofthe
dea would be super ioial if t tried to Irm.It"9
1tseli' !2, sTrapio beauty;." 02-

hions

Rosenkranz' final position seems to be that •. despite
'·

the admioaion that simple beauty is not adequate to art, ugli-

'

ness still cannot have an independent-existenoe there; tor

it beauty does not need a toil, the ugly does.
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Detore venturing a summary ot the period

or

German

aesthetics, it might be well to mention one French philosopher,
whose writing has soma bearing

on the matter.

Victor Cousin,

in his Lecturas on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, says

that the only way

or

escaping the absurd relativism in beauty

52. Rosenkranz, Aesthetik des Hassliohen, quoted in Bosanquet,

.212.•.2!1•.

p. 404.

53. Bosanquet •

.21?.•.2!!• 1 p. 404.

45

and usliness !s to reoosnize Judsment of the beautiful.as

an absolute judgment entirely attrerent tram sensations ot
agreeableness.

54

For, he writes:

"Without doubt, beauty 1s almost always agree-.
able to the senses 1 or at least it tllUSt not
woti.nd them." 55
'
"Tha agreeable is not 1 then, the measure ot the
benut1fult e1noe 1n certain oases it ettaoes
it and makes us forget it; it is not, then,
the beaut!tul, ainoe it is found, and in tho
highest degree, whoro the beautiful is not." 56
A thing, Cousin continues, can be at onoe hideous

and sublime. For example, he suggests tho face or Socrates
utter the hemlock; the expression or.death is hideous showL"lS

"decomposition ot the matter thnt no longer retains the
f!lpirlt • • • " and sublime, "when it awakens in us the idea
57

ct eternity.• "
Dy meana of physical beauty, art attains its end
\\'hich is tho expression of moral beauty;

58

tor art•s business
59

ts to ennoble lite, l!ttins it to whore ugliness is not admitted.
nThe true artist tools and protoundly admires
nature; but every thing in nature is not
·
,equally admirable. As we have just said,
it has something by which it infinitely
surpasses art • its life. Beaides that,
art oan, in its turn, surpass nature, on

54. Viator Cousin Lectures on the True, the noaut1tul, and the
. Good, tra.nsla!ea. 61 d. •,cl. Virlght, liow York, 1679 1 o. Appleton,
PP• l28•l29•
55. Ibid., ·P• 126
56. '16!<1., P• 127 t

57. Ibid., P• 148.

oo. Ib!d'.., P• 157.

59. 1b17r., P• 160.
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the condition ot not wishing to imitate it
too closely. Every natural object, however
beautiful, is detective on some side. Every
thing that is real is imperfect. Hera, the
horrible and the hideous are united to the
sublime; there, elegance and grace are separ- ·
ated from grandeur and force. The traits ot
beauty ara scattered end diverse. To reunite
them arbitrarily • • • without any rule ••.•
(that) directs these borrowings, is to compose
monsters; to admit a rule, is already to admit
an ideal different from all individuals. · It
is this ideal that the true artist forms to·
himself in studying nature. Without nature,
he never would· have oonoeived this ideal; but
with this ideal, he judges nature herself,
(and) rectifies her ••• " 60
The question will arise, finally, as to ..exactly
what advances these idealistic German aestheticians have
made over the state of the problem as it was left with the

early thinkers and the romantio tendencies 1n Burke, Kant,
and Baumgarten.

For one thing, we have tor the first time,

in Schelling and Schopenhauer, the dogmatic denial of the
existence of any real ugliness; and also, the
the ugly as the antithesis

in.~he

conc~pt

of

full revelation ot the Idea.

Not completely original but more pronounced is the accentuation of the "oharactoristio" by Schelling, Schlegel, Sohaaler,
and Hartmann particularly; and the connection of ugliness
with the comic in Bolger, Ruge, and Weisse.

Most important,

ot course, is that tendency which is an outgrowth ot the very
body of idealistic and pantheistic philosophy - the emphasis

60. Ibid., p, 176.
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on the ideal, the seeking tor an inner spiritual reality
whioh does not reveal itself in the merely supertioial aspects ot'things.

For this reason, art at best, is profound;

supertioiality is ugly, a tenet brought out most directly
in the aesthetics of Solger.

48

CHAPTER IV
MODERN THINKERS: THE APPROACH TBllOUGH A PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM
l.

Nietzsche

"Art", writes Nietzsche, the romantic par excellence,
"is the alleviation ot the sufferer -- as the way to states
in which pain is willed, is transfigured, is deified, where

suttering is a form ot great eostaoy."
new standard ot value.

l

In him, we get a .

Art is not to be judged as good or

bad, true or false, .not even beautiful or ugly, as absolutes -everything is to be judged according to the degree ot value
2

it affords the development of the Superman •. Nietzsche opposes
the traditional aesthetics, charging it with otherworldliness,
a quality it should not possess because art is really the
,

3

"affirmation, benediction, deification ot existence."

Similar-

ly, he repudiates the cult of originality and the lax romantic
ideal ot spontaneous creativity.

4

l. Friedrioh'Nietzsche, The Will to Power, quoted in Rader,
,IDl•Cit., P• 67.

2. George Burman Foster, Friedrich Nietzsche, New York, 1931 1
Macmillan, p. 138. ·
3. Nietzsche, £.E.·~·• quoted in Rader,, Qit.oit., p. 61.
4. Gilbert and Kuhn, .21?.•2.!l•, P• 519.
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Nietzsche's vie\v ot art, and in particular ot ugliness, is rather overwhelming, but it is not so startling
when we recall Burke.

Not only art tor art's sake but art

tor life's sako is his creed; and life, itself, is a work
5

ot art. The judgment ot beauty does not concern reality.

6

Indeed, the judgment "beauti:i'ul" is given in direct proportion to the strength and power ot the judge, in whom impotence would cause a judgment of disvalue in powerful artob jeots.

"(A) taste tor pretty. and charming 7trifles is

characteristic of the weak and the delicate."

,

.

It is the

. a··

artists ot decadence who seek refuge in formal beauty.

"The depth of the tragic artist oon.Diste
in the tact that his esthetio instinct surveys
the more remote results, that he does not
halt shortsightedly at the thing that is
nearest; that he says Yea to the whole cosmic
economy, which justifies the terrible, the
evil! and the questionable; which more than
just ties it." 9 ·
·
The highest condition ot "yea-saying" is not one

where the greatest pain is excluded. This highest state is 1
10
in taot, the tragioo-Dionysian state.
In this Dionysian
enchantment, we pass beyond the usual bonds ot existence;
and-horror and joy merge "in the eternal flux or things,

5. Foster, .QI?.•~·• p. 137.
6. Gilbert and Kuhn, .s!J?.•.2.!!•, P• 520.
7. Nietzsche, .2:2.•cit., quoted in Rader, £E.•.2.!l•• P• 64.
a. Ibid. 1 p. 61>.
9. Ibid.; pp. 65-66.
10. Ibid., p. 68.
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"To represent'terrible and questione.ble
things is, in itself, the sign of an instinct
of power and magnificence in the artist; he
doesn't tear them • • • • There is no such
thing as a pessimistic art • • • • ~t affirms.
Job affirms. But Zola? and the Goncourts? The things they show us are ugly; their reason,
however, for·show1ng them to us is their love
of ugliness ••• •" 12
The reason why Zola and the Gonoourts and the work

ot similar artists are to be excluded is given in the following
paragraph which also gives the gist of Nietzsche's entire
notion:
"Nothing is ugly except degene'ratins man; the domain of esthetio judgment Is thereby
limited. - Re-examined physiologically, all
.that is ugly weakens and afflicts man. It
reminds him of deterioration, of danger, and ·

11• Gilbert and Kuhn, £!?.·~·• P• 520.
12• Nietzsche, 2R.•.2.!i•• quoted in Rader,

.21?.•~·•

pp. 61-62.
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ot impotence; he actually suffers loss ot
power by it. The efteot of ugliness can be
measured by the dynamometor. Whenever.man is
depressed, he has a sense of the proximity ot
something ugly. His sense of power, his will
to power, his courage, his pride - they de- ·
crease with the ugly, they increase with the
beautiful. In both oases we draw e.n inference,
the premises ot which are acoumuiated iii enormous tulness ot instinct. The ugly is understood as a sign and symptom of degeneration;.
that which reminds us in the remotest manner
ot degeneracy prompts us to pronounce the· verdict, •ugly'. Every indication or exhaustion,
gravity; ago, or lassitude; every kind of constraint, such as cramp or paralysis; and above
all the odour, the colour, and the l~keness of
decomposition or putrefaction, be it·· utterly
attenuated even to a symbol:- all these things
call forth a similar reaction, the evaluation
•ugly.• A hatred is there excited: whom does
man hate there? There oan be no doubt: the
decline ,2! .!!!! ~. The hatred is insrired by
the most protoun0:1llst1not,or the species; ,
there is horror, foresi8ht, and far-reaching
vision in it - it is.the_profoundest ot all
hatreds. on account or it, art.is profound." 13
,

2.

Bosang_uet

So long as persons exist, writes Bosenquet, there
must be two uses ot the word, "beauty" - a narrower and a
14

"Beautiful" is the only word we can find
15
for the property of aesthetic excellence.
We also need a

wider meaning.

13. F. Nietzsche, quoted in John Hemming Fry, The Revolt Against
Beaut;y:: The source and Genesis of Modernistic Art, New York,
l934, Putnam, pp. 16-17.
14. Bernard Bosanquat, Three Lectures on the Aesthetic, London,
1931,·Maomillan, p. 83.
15~ Ibid., PP• 83•84.
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word tor the aesthetically pleasant, and the word "beaut1tul"
16
will never be abandoned here.
"So than; we ma.1 say that beauty in the
wider· sense, whioh is-also the more oorreot
sense, and the sense,oome to by education,
and that preferred I think by persons endowed
with much aesthetic insight - beauty in this
wider sense is the same as what is aesthetically excellent. But by a justified usage,·
this wider sense ot beauty which equals aea~
thetioally excellent must be taken as contain~
ing two classes, that.of easy beauty and that,
of diffioult·beauty 4 • • " . 17
It is these concepts,

or

easy and difficult beauty,

which are particularly noteworthy as bearing on our topic and
also as having influenced many subsequent thinkers.

Easy

beauty is that which is almost universally pleasant, &traight18
forward and simple.
He continues:
"The·diffioulty 1 amounting for some persons
to repollenoe, which belongs to such beauty as
makes the rarer appeal, may take different forms.
I suggest three. I do not say that they cover
all the oases. I will call them: (a) Intricacy;
(b) Tension; (o) Width." 19
Bosanquet teals there is a tendency to revulsion
against insoluble difficulties such as those possibly occasioned
20
by a high degree of "intricacy."
"The difficult beauty simply
gives you too muoh, at one moment, of what you are perfectly
_,
21
prepared to enjoy if only you could take it all in."
This

16. Ibid., p. 84.
17. lb~~ •• pp. 84-85.

18. Ibr<i.; P• 85.
19.

20~
21~

Ibid., P• 87.

Ibi!., P•

ea.·

Ibfci., p. 89.
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is likewise the case with high "tension" of feeling, which
I

requires too great an effort on the part of the spectator.

22

Another detect on the part or the spectator io illustrated
where "width" is oonoerned.

This is the most difficult.to

understand ot the three concepts.

By 1t Bosanquet seems to

mean the presence of a "wide range of forms, all of them
distinguished by an attitude taken up towards the conventional
. 23

attitude."
The differentiations of easy and difficult beauty
are made in order to extend the term to cover the aesthetically excellent, and to lead the way to a discussion of ugliness.

The author hopes that, by the previous distinctions,

the tendency to make ugliness the antithesis of beauty will
be somewhat removed, since "intricacy", "tension", and "width"
will explain many judgments of ugliness in what is really
.
24
(difficult) beauty.
Then, so-called ugliness is a defect in the spectator.
But what

or

true ugliness, which would mean an inoonquerable

ugliness wh!oh no amount ot aesthetic insight oould pronounce
beautiful?

25

This problem involves a paradox: if a thing has

no expressive form, it is not of the aesthetic realm; but, it
it has, 1t is beautiful, since beauty is feeling made plastic

22. Ibid., p. 89.
23. lbl'd., p. 94.
24. Ibld. 1 PP• 94-95.

25. Ibia., P• 97.
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or expressive.

26

In other words, an ugliness that is expres-

sive is, ipso raoto, a beauty.

so-called ugliness, although

the spectator is at fault, must be treated and explained with
as much seriousness as invincible ugliness.

27

But "ugliness

cannot be merely the expression ot what will not go into
definite form.

Even in the revulsion against difficult beauty,

it has a positive quality of disoordanoy, though perhaps one
28

which we ought to be able to overcome."

A

medley of beautiful

things combined so that, in contradicting each other, the
total result is or ugliness, can only halt-heartedly be called
ugly.

29

In tracking down invincible ugliness, Bosanquet writes

(recalling Solger):
"It there· is a truly ugly which is aesthetically judged, and which is not merely a failure
ot our imagination, it must be an appearance
which is both expressive and inexpressive at 30
once, aesthetically judged, yet unaesthetic."

So that region wherein would abide absolute ugliness,
it it existed, would be the region
and

31

affected.

or

art which is insincere

There is an almost Socratic strain here, as

Bosanquet speaks or the beauty of useful objects, and the
positive ugliness resulting from "any attempt to confer upon
32

them mare decorative beauty inconsistent with their purpose • • • ft

26. Ibid.; pp. 97-98.
27. Ibid., pp. 99.100.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
fbid.,

P• 101.
pp. 101-102.
p. 103.
p. 106.
p. 108.
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Bosanquet•s tendency to disbelief in the existence
ot·any'possible unconquerable ugliness is one of many indications of the Hegelian and idealistic strain running.throughout his philosophy.

But he tells us in what phase of art it

would be found, should it exist:
"Therefore what we have to dread as ugliness insuperable either by healthy perception
or by the 'characteristic' of art, is not the
narrow, the rude, the terrible, the grotesque,
or even the vicious when frankly and torcibly
revealed tor what it is; as plainly represented
in their apparent ugliness, these elements become modifications of the beautiful. We must
look tor insuperable ugliness in its highest
degree in the talsely beautiful produced by the
contusion of aims and feelings in conscious ..
representation, i.e. in art. We shall find it
in the sentimental presented as touching, the
effeminate as tender, in the feeble taken to
be delicate, the tawdry taken to be brilliant,
and the monstrous taken to be strong." 33.
Bosanquet must be given credit tor his excellent
distinction (between beauty in the wide sense and in the
narrow sense), which has done a great deal to clarify the
problem ot so-called ugliness. However, there is a matter
,
which
ot contusion in his theory/comes to mind. He seems to be
equating easy beauty with the strictly beautiful, an equation
which aesthetic fact and experience will not warrant; tor, by
his definition ot easy beauty, it seems to be that of easiest
reception, the simply pretty, the charming - whereas the
strictly .beautiful obviously possesses a great deal more

33. Bosanquet, Hi.story of Aesthetic, p. 435.
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protundity. The strictly beautiful is, in other words, not
necessarily a beauty of easy reception; in fact, one of its
criteria should be depth.

3.

Dewoy

John Dewey we11· illustrates the deduction ot aesthetics from a philosophical system, tor the instrumentalist
strain colors markedly the small amount of material he gives,
relating to the present problem.
"The only basic distinction is that between
bad art and good art, and this distinction, between things that meet the requirements of art
and those that do not, applies equally to things
of use and ot beauty. Capacity to offer to perception meaning in which fruition and efficacy
interpenetrate is met by difterent products in
various degrees ot fullness; it may be missed
altogether by pans and poems alike. The difference between the ugliness of a mechanically
conceived and executed utensil and ot a meretricious and pretentious painting is one only of
content or material; in form, both are articles,
and bad articles • • • • ·" 34
Fine art, he continues, is instrumental, existing

tor educational purposes, to train modes of perception.

35

He

echoes a not very original excuse for ugliness in art, that
it contributes to the aesthetic effect ot the larger whole.
What may as elements be Judged ugly - discord, clashing color,

34. John Dewey, Experience and Nature, quoted in Rader, -22•.ill.•,
P• 4G3.
35. Ibid., p. 465.
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cacophonies - may become a part of beauty according to the
vmy they are related.

are habitual.

Values may be concealed because they

"Ordinary prepossession must be broken through

it tho degree ot energy required tor an esthetic experience
. 36

ia to be evoked."
There is much redundancy in the slight occasions
where Dewey does speak of ugliness; and knowing that he is
not interested in the arts as ends in themselves, we see why 1
consequently• he has little theoretical contribution to otter.
The following quotation may afford an adequate summary:
"The moot problem or the place or the ugly .
in works ot art see.ms to me to receive its'
solution when its terms are seen in this context. That to which the word 'ugly' is applied_
is the object in its customary assooiat1ons 1
those which have come to appear an inherent
part of soma object. It does not apply to what
is present in the picture or drama. There is
transformation beoause ot emergence in an objeot
havins its own expressiveness: exactly as in the
case of Renoir's nudes. Something which was
ugly under other conditions, the usual ones,
is extracted from the conditions in which it
was repulsive and·is transfigured in quality
as it becomes a part of an expressive whole.
In its new setting, the very contrast with a
former ugliness adds piquancy, animation, and 1
in serious matters, increases depth of meaning
in an almost incredible way." 37

36. John Dewey, Art as Experience, New York, 1934, Minton,

Balch, P• 173.

37. Ibid., pp. 95-96 •.
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4.

An

Bereson

inclusion of Henri Bergson's theor1 of the comio

may seem an unnecessary digression.

But we have seen how,

since the old ·areeks, the notion ot the comic has been in
various ways related to ugliness in or out of the aesthetic
realm; and since this has been the case,c there follow here
a few of the most pertinent ideas of Bergson.
In the first place, he says, the comic does not
exist beyond what is human.

38

The laughable element may
. 39

consist of various things: a mechanical inelasticity,
independent rigidifying vice,
.

·41

person could copy well,
. '

40

-42

an

a deformity that a normal

always rigidness rather than pure

In movement or· gesture, the comic may abide in
43
what seems essentially mechanical,
in an incident Which

ugliness.

directs attention
oono~rned,

44

~o

the physical when the moral is primarily

and other such actions.

With regard to comic

words, the law may be stated generally: "In a comic repetition
of words we generally find two terms: a repressed feeling

which goes ott like a spring, and an idea that delights in
repressing the feeling anew."

45

38. Henri Bergson, LaueJlter: An Essay on the Meaning ot the Comic,
translated by Brereton and Rothwell, New York, 1921 1 Macmillan,
p.

3~.

39. Ibid.; P• 10.
40. Ibid., PP• 15-16.
41.

ibid.,

p. 23.

42. lb!!., P• 29.
43. Ibl!., P• 29.

44.·Ibid.; P• 51.
45. Ibid., P• 73.
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Tragic· art, writes Dergson, is always directed at
46

what is individual.

Comedy, on the other hand, is essentially

concerned with generalities and similarities.

47

These two

forms also differ in the kind of observation which generates
their characters.

48

Comedy, he concludes, lies midway between

lite and art, being not so disinterested as genuine art.

49

On the nature of the comic, he writes:

"Laughter is, above all, a oorreotive. Being
intended to humiliate, it must make a painful
impression on.the person asainst whom it is
directed. Dy laughter, society avenges itself
for the liberties taken with it. It would
tail in its object if it bore the eta.mp ot
sympathy or kindness." 50
And'what is the bearing ot this discussion on the
topic ot ugliness? Aside from the raot that comedy has
been, in general theoretical terms, linked with the ugly, we
can also find, more particularly, that some ot the oharaoter-

istio comic etfeots are those elements which we may judge
ugly - especially when they do not occur in a total oomioal
field.

Bergson's general thesis or comedy takes its departure

lrom the notion of "something mechanical en:crusted on the
51
living." Aside trom this, have we not called ugly, in other

46. Ibid.,
47. Ibid.,
48. Ibld. 1
49. Ibid.9

p. 1619
P• 163.
pp. 165-169.
P• 170.
50. Ibid., P• 197.
51. Ibid•t P• 37.
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contexts, that which is rigid, mochanical, vicious in certain
vmys • all things t'lhioh arc essentially com.lo.
What Bergson seems to have said is simply that in

lite one thing is really ugly, - the occasion of some living
thing's becoming mechanical.

Whether this natural and real

ugliness can be aesthatioally treated is our old problem;
and Bergson's answer is Yes - in comedy.

5.

Alexander

Alexander begins by pointing out that the opposite

ot beauty should be the "aesthetically disapproved or indifterent" since beauty has been definod as the
approved."

52

0

a.asthet1cally

Ugliness, in common parlance, generally denotes

that which is displeasing.

"But 'beautiful' is used and per-

haps oftenest in a special senae, and 'ugly' may also be so
used, and in that special sense both the beautiful and the
ugly are departments of the beautiful in its sense of the
aesthetically approved. n

53
.

He contrasts real ugliness with the ugliness which

is a kind of beauty, agreeing with Bosanquet's oonoept ot
difficult beauty, and further explaining suoh beauty to be
like discords in music and horrors of tragedy which are transmuted

52. Samuel Alexander, Beauty and Other Forms or Value, London,
1933;·Macmillan, p. l63.
53. Ibido, P• 163.
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1n becoming a part of beauty.

Contrast, ho asks, tho reputed

treatment of Walter Savage Landor by his daughter with the
behavior of Regan and Goneri.l, and you have the distinction
between real ugliness and that which is difficult beauty.

54

"Thus nothing is beautitul, whether in itself unattractive or attractive, save so far
as it is aesthetically good; and accordingly
the ugly and the beautiful as kinds of beauty
owe their beauty to their treatment (whether
in nature or art) and the distinction of the
beauti1'ul and the ugly is seen to be one of
subject matter." 55

6.

San tay;an.l!

As a prelude to interpreting Santayana's aesthetics

ot ugliness,/ it is wall to point out that art, in his opinion,
.

is, .or should be, subject

.

t~

moral censorship;

56

.

because,

since art is a part of life, its criticism is a part of morals.

57

The preoedenoo of morals over aesthetics thus limits the aes-

thetic field:

"our sense or praotioal benetit not only
determines the moral value or beauty, but
sometimes even its existenoo as an aesthetic
good. Especially in the right selection of
effects, these considerations have weight.
Forms in themselves pleasing may become

64. Ibid., p. 164.
55~

Ibid., P• 165.

56. Georga Santayana, The Life of Reason or the Phases of Human
Pro~ess• Reason-in Art, New York, 1921, Sorlbner•s, p. l66.
57. lbl ., P• 178.
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disagreeable when the practical interests
then uppermost in the mind cannot, without
violence, yield a place to them." 58

In other words, nothing is ugly in itselt; but
things are

ug~y

because ot a demand tor something else - so,

must the arts "stand modestly aside."
The ugly

is no

values are positive.

ot amusement.

59

exception to the rule that aesthetic

It is no real cause ot pain, but one
J

It, however, it becomes vitally repulsive,

it is a real evil; and we judge it trom a moral standpoint.
Let us go, for a

60

to the nature of beauty,

~oment,

which Santayana defines as "pleasure regarded as the quality
. 61

ot a thing,"

-

"pleasure objectified."

62

Beauty is, as we

have said, a positive value, the presence ot something good,
as ugliness is the absence ot something good.
as

But it is never,

above, a negative value or the presence ot a positive evil.

63

"When the ugly ceases to be amusing or merely uninteresting
and becomes disgusting", he repeats, "it becomes indeed a
positive evil: but a moral and practical, not an aesthetic
. 64

one."

"' limits
It is more to the point to discuss within what

58. George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty: Being the OUtlines

of Aesthetic Theory, New York, Chicago, and Boston, 1896,
sorlbner•s, p. 219.

59.
60.

Ibid.~

Ibid.;

p. 220.
P• 25.

e1. fbid.,·p. 49.

62. Ibid., p. 52.
63. Ibid., p. 49.
64. Ibid., p·. 50.
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Santayana says that beauty ot the

ugliness can enter art.

first term, i.e. "beauty ot sound, rhythm, and image",, can
make

any thing artistic, whereas without this beauty nothing

can be so.

The value or such immediate beauty often excuses

the presence of painful and terrible objects in art;
softens their violence.

66

it

Art does not choose ugliness, we

may inter, but lite·1tself
·57

65

~oses

,..

it upon the attention;.

Therefore, "truth is thus the excuse
68
which ugliness has for being."
it is inevitable.

\

'

His opinion seems to be that tragedy and comedy,·
which are impure, please in spite of, rather than because ot,
themselves•

They are useless unless they are instrumental

to some moral or practical purposes.

Ugliness can attract

attention and vulgar admiration; but such admiration, it
prolonged, is non-aesthetic; it is due to a dulled sense of
69
"To purge away these impurities • • • nothing is
beauty.
needed but a quickened intelligence, ·a keener spiritual flame."
Finally, he writes, and his entire theory gives
little that is original or helpful:
"Nothing but the good of life enters into
the texture or the beautiful. What charms us
in the oomio, what stirs us in the sublime and

65. Ibid., p. 205.
66. Ib!d~~ p; 221~
67. Ibid •• P• 221.
68.

69.

Ibld.i
Ib!d.,

p~ 231.

P• 259.
70• Santayana, Life of Reason. Reason in Art, P• 198.
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touches us in the pathetic, is n glimpse ot
some good; impertection has value only as an
1no1p1ent pertoot1on. Could the labours end
sufferings ot life be reduced, nnd a better
harmony between mnn nnd nature be established,
nothing would be lost to the arts; for the .
pure and ultimate value or the oom.10 is discovery. ot the pathetic, love, or the sublime,
exaltation; and these would still subsist." '11
'l.

Vlhitahead

"Bonutyn, writes fJhitehead, "is ·tho mutual adaptation of the several

t~otors

in nn oooasion or experience."

72

And, "art is purposeful adaptation ot nppoaranoo to Reality."

73

H1o theory concerns solf•exprosaion 1n which "beauty emorees
out or·a prooeas as ind1vidunl1ty"; and the process "issues
into determinate beauties; on less rortunato occasions, where
there is frustration and 1nh1b1t1on, it issues into usliness.n
~bitehoad,
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also, has tho notion of perteot1on ot

eubjeotive form, which means that none ot tho component 1"eel-

or an artistic expor1onoa aro tnu.tually inhibitive. The
notion or inhibition has two meaninsas first. one which 1s
1ngs

not concerned with pertoot1on at nll, but is "annoathesia";

75

Snnta1ana, Dense of neaut , PP• 260-2Gl.
Alfred nor Wb tebcad, Adventures of Ideas, New York, 1933,
Maom1llan 1 P• 324•
Ib1d-. 1 p, 344•
Bartram Morris, "The Art-Process and the Aesthetic Fact in
Whitoheod's Philosophy" in Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), The
l?hilosooh,z ot Alfred North \'.'hi tohoo.d, Chicago, l94r.
Horthwontorn University l'ross, P• 4?7.
\~bi tohead 1

.9l?.•.2ll.• 1

p, . 529.

65

the other, Which "involves the truer active presence of both
component

~eelings n

and a third element of mutual destruc-

tiveness, so that one ot these component feelings does not
rise t? the proper strength.

Thia is, contrary to the first
·76

meaning ot inhibition, the factor of "aesthetic destruction."

The experience of this aesthetic destruction is an experience
77
ot discord.
Here

we

come to his distinction between discord and

dissonance.

Discord, which we have linked with aesthetic

des~ruction,

is a positive taot ot evil.

something else.

But dissonance-is

Art thrives in that dissonance which is re•

solved, eventually, into consonance.

78

Yet even discord has

soma value, (note the Hegelian tendency):
"On further consideration we sh~il find that
always there are imperfect occasions better than
oooasions which realize some given type of perfection. There are in tact higher and lower
perfections; and an imperfection aiming at a
higher type stands above lower perfection. The
most material and the most sensuous enjoyments
are yet types of Beauty. Progress is founded
upon the experience of discordant feelings. The
social value of liberty lies in its production
ot discords. Thero are perfections beyond perteotions. All realization is finite, and there
is no perfection whioh is the infinitude of all
perfections. Perfections of diverse types are
among themselves discordant. Thus the contribution to Beauty which-can be supplied by Discord in itself destructive and evil - is the positive

76. Ibid., pp. 329-330.

77. Ibid., P• 330.
78. Borris, .El2.·~·• p. 474.
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feeling of a quick shift of aim from the tameness or outworn perfection to some other ideal
with its freshness still upon it. Thus the
value of Discord 1s7'tribute to the merits of
Imperfection." 79

Discord is prefer.able to· anaesthesia or the aesthetic
tameness which goes before it.

A higher Imperfection is bet-

·so

tar than· a lower Perfection, in ahort.

We can infer from Whitehead's philosophy that ugliness is the inhibition of higher values that might have been
81
attained;
but that ugliness is artistically admisaable if
it enhances the total object or if it saves the object trom
degenerating into something capable of atfording no aesthetic

experit;tnce.

Art, Whitehead describes as "a payohopathio reaction
82

by the race to the stresses of its existence,"

"Decay, Tran-

sition, Loss, Displacement belong to the essence

or

Advance."

83

the Creative

And in the long run for Whitehead, as tor Santayana 9

there is little essential difference between moral and aesthetic
values.

84

a.

Crooe and Gentile

Before Croce will tell what art is, he tells what ·

9.1?.•.!?.i!••
81. Morris, .QR.•£.!1•, P•
79. Vlhitehead,

800 Ibid., ·p. 339.

82. Whitehee.cr;
83. Ibid., PP•

3P•..<:!il•,

68-369.

PP• 330-331.

475.
P• 350.

84. Morrie, .QR.•~· , p. 456.
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it is not.

Among other things, art is not a physical taot,
·86

not a utilitarian taot,
88

oeptual knowledge.
is lyrical intuition;
sive knowledge."

not a moral act,

87

.

85

and not a oon-

Art, insof'ar as we oan put it briefly,
89

and "intuitive knowledge is expres-

90

"What we admire in genuine works ot art is
the perfect fanciful f'orm which a stato of· the
soul assumes; and we call this lite, unity,
solidity of the work of art. What displeases
us in the false and imperf'eot forms is the
struggle of several ditf'arent states of the
soul not yet unified, their stratification,
or mixture, their vacillating method,-whioh
obtains apparent unity from the will of .the
author, who for this purpose avails himself'
of' an abstract plan or idea, or of' extraesthetic, passionate emotion•~· 91
And so, returning to Pythagoras, ugliness is identified with multiplicity.

The beautiful doea not admit de-

grees; but ugliness does, varyina from the almost beautiful

to the intensely ugly.

Still, it it possessed no element ot

beauty, it would not be ugly, "because it would be without
the contradiction in whioh is the reason

or

its existence.

The d1svalue would become non-value; activity would give
place to passivity, with which it is not at war, save when
92

activity is really present to oppose it."

85. Benedetto Croce, A Dreviary of Aesthetic, quoted 1n Rader,

.Ql!.•.ill•, P• 159.

86~ ~id.,

P• 161.
87. Ibid., P• 163.

ea. tbla., PP• ia5-1ae.
89. Ibid.; p. 173.
90. Ibid., P• 177.

91. Ibid., pp. 171-172.

92. Croce, Aesthetic, p. 79.
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.Connected with the judgment ot ugliness which may _
:

f

•

be ma.de in the presence of certain art works, it is interesting how Croce differentiates true aesthetic teeling from.
certain concomitant atfeotive e:xperiences.

He says that

aesthetic pleasure may be reinforced by the pleasure coming
93
tram "extraneous tacts."
This principle quite easily and
logically applies to aesthetic displeasure.
. Ugliness is finally reduced simply to unsuccessful
94

expression.

Crooe writes:
"Somebody who has nothing definite to express may tru to oonoeal·his internal emptiness in a flood of words, in sounding ver,se,
1n deafening polyphony, in painting that
dazzles the eye, or by heaping together great
architectural masses which arrest and astonish
. us without· oonvenng anything· whatever. Ugliness, then, is the capricious, the oharlatanes~ue;
and, in reality, if practical oapr1oe did not
intervene in the theoretic tunotion, there might
be absence of beauty, but never the real presence of something deserving the adjestive
·
'ugly'." 95

This constitutes a theoretioal return to Baumgarten

and the romantic notion of the imagination.

Finally, for

Croce, that whioh is a unified, adequate expression of the
artist's intuition is, ipso facto, beauty.
Croce's opinion is similar to' that of Giovanni
Gentile who says, "'rhe ugly oan be nothing. but the expre.ssion

' '

93. Ibid.1 P• 60.

94. Ibld.; P• 79.
95~ Iblu.; P• 98.
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of feelings into which a man has not put the 16.ola of himself;
that is to say 1 superficial feelings not profoundly tolt."
To

96

sUmm.arize-this period, it should first be pointed

out that Nietzsche, though the genosis ot his theory can be
traced to B'Jrka and the

rom.a~tio

a new standard of judgment.

tendonoies, almost gives us

Aesthotio ugliness* not legiti-

mate in art, is that which is symptomatic of weakness and

degeneracy; while so-called ugliness, as we have known it
1n the terrible and thG evil, is unquestionably legitimate

artistic material of tho best quality if it stimulates the
development of the Superman.

Hegelian idealism mid pantheism.

are reflected in Bosanquet, Whitehead, Groce, and Gentile . ·
with their tendencies aither toward a dialectical position
or a denial of absolute ugliness.

Croce, in particular, is

important for his concept of ugliness as unsuccessful aesthetic
expression, or of superficiality, as seen in the minor German
aesthetioians who followed Hegel.

Bosanquet•s importance

has been shown to be largely his distinction between beauty
1

in-the wide and narrow senses,·though some difficulty is
discovered in his apparent equating ot easy beauty with the
strictly beautiful.

It is well to note, through this chapter

with Gentile and Orooe as the culmination, that the theories
are pointing more and more towards liberalism and

rel~tivism,

96. Giovanni Gentile, Philosophl of Art, quoted in Carritt,
.Q.P.•~•• P• 330.
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a tact which will be brought out more

pro~inently

in the

modern aestheticians discussed in the next ohayter.
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CHAPTER V

MODERN THINKERS:

APPROACH THROUGH

A

STUDY OF CONCRETE ART

These modern thinkers have been separated from
those ot the preceding chapter tor the reason indicated by
the above title - that their contributions, by and large,
tend to be tor aesthetics, qua aesthetics, rather than via

a philosophical system.
cated:

Four general positions can be indi-

first, ugliness as connected with painful art; second,

ugliness admitted into art under certain qualified conditions;
third, ugliness admitted under more liberal conditions; and
finally, closely allied with the foregoing group, a subjective
position, in which ugliness is almost purely relative.
1.

Painful Art:

De Witt Parker

In DeWitt Parkex-'s book, The Analysis ot Art, there

is a chapter on "Art and Pain", which ma.y be of particular
s1gn1tioanoe 11' we remember that the judgment ot ugliness .may
sometimes arise trom an occasion ot "painful" art.

The present

'12

writer does not mean to identify aesthetic ugliness with aesthetic pain, but only to point out Parker's chapter as having
a probable pertinenoe to our: problem.
Parker says that since works ot art are by men and

tor men, they must give plea.sure; and he asks, in view ot
this, why pain should'Voluntarily be introduced into art.
art, he continues, . is too large a part
. of . the
. whole
1
to be dismissed as "morbid, decadent, disguised ugliness."

P~intul

.

~en

why? For one thing, • an obvious answer • since art is

imaginative, the representation of painful objects is less
painful than the real experiences; and consequently,. our emo.

.

.

2

tions are not so strong.

There is also given the reason that

pain is mitigated by the "sensuous charm and beauty ot the
.

3

design of the medium", which view Parker rejects.
His own theory involves a division of paintul art
into three categories.

The first, Dionysian, gives imaginative

satisfaction to the primitive elements in man, and to the contlicts within his dual nature.

4

The second, satirical or real-

istic art, has its genesis in the same dualism; but is an 1deal1stio restraint upon the animal nature since it inspires disgust
at the evils represented.

This type of art also satist1e4 a

1. DeWitt·H. Parker, The·Analysis ot Art, New Haven, 1926, ·
Yale University Press, PP• 102-103.
2~ Ibid~; p. 104.
3. Ibid.; p. 106. ·
4. Ibid., PP• 107, 108, 110.
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desire tor knowledge; provides some sort of emotional, release

tor anger, tear, terror, and the like; and inoludes the oomio,
'

.

.

by which man's pride is ted.

5

.

The third category ot painful

art covers the IJl1Stioal, religious, and tragic, which are
6

preoccupied with suttering.

.

Ot this, Parker says, "Thus not

only is religious art akin to realistic art in its preoccupation with evil, but also in its fundamental.motive of etteoting an adjustment to lite as a whole."

7

The desire tor a total adjustment to lite is the
final reason he gives tor the portrayal of evil (pain):
"To·use again the language and the ideas of
Goethe, man has the pressing need to come to
some certain understanding with himself concerning life as a whole, and particularly
concerning the most battling element of it,
evil. Man must race the facts, all the facts,
and find a way of living at peace. with them · / ·
and with himself. It 1s essentially this purpose, so it seems to me, that is fulfilled in
a
the more reflective representations of evil •• •"
2. Ugliness under Certain qualified Conditionf:!:··
Raymond and Carpenter

This position which admits little ugliness may,

-oon~

oeivably, present itself by denying or excusing away the fact
ot ugliness; but such theory will generally tall into the

5. Ibid., pp. 1071 lll, 114, 115, 118. 120.
6. Ibia., pp. 107, 125.
7. Ibid., p. 126.

a. fbia.,

p. i22.
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oategory ot relativistic thinkers.

The truth is that few

modern thinkers.exclude, dogmatically, the possibility ot
aesthetic ugliness.
Contusion 1n art, says G, L. Raymond, is sometimes
9

legitimate because there is contusion in nature. .He writes:
.· "The truth seems· to be that-ugliness,
· simply because it is repulsive, is not legit·.· imate- in art· except so tar as, by way of contrast, as in the case ot shadows which throw that which they surround into brighter relief,
the ugliness enhances the beauty to which it
is· kept 1n manifest subordination•" 10

In other words, he is employing the ancient "foil"
theory, and insofar as ugliness, qua ugliness, is obviously
not considered legitimate, the classification ot Raymond here
is justified.
\

i

It is somewhat the same with Rhys Carpenter, who is
rather liberal, except that ugliness, as any perversion of
natural tact, cannot enter art. His energetic disavowal of
ugliness is largely directed at contemporary art:
"Extreme painters - the outragists, if I
may so dub them - often depart very widely trom
Nature. I must confess that to me distortions
and malformations ot decent human anatomy invariably introduoe·a strong element ot displeasure
and a revulsion away from all sympathetic contemplation, so that my final emotion is strongly
modified by these unfavorable elements. Now it
is a matter ot experience that wherever dislike

9• George Lansing Raymond, The Genesis· of Art-Form: An Essax
in Comparative Aesthetics, New York, 1693, Putnam, p. 36.
10. George Lansing Raymond, The Representative s1sy1ticanoe of
Form: ·An·Essai in Compar~tive Aesthetics, New ork, 1900,
Ptitnam, p., 20 •
0

'15

and repulsion are markedly present as components, the resultant esthetio emotion 13 not
likely to be ot much value." 11
These outragists, as he calls them, are ·1nolined to

sever too greatly art and nature, expecting the potency ot
abstract value to replace our old at:reotive alliances with
12
tho sensuous wcirld.
He says that the suppression either

ot pure form or ot representational fidelity, by the other,
1s artistically wrong;

13

but the tone of his writing indi-

cates that he balances the scales in tavor ot representational
fidelity.

From his doing so, we may see that ugliness is

hardly excusable, even as contributing to a larger whole,
if it means that natural tact is distorted. We may infer
/

th~t,

as subject matter, it is admissable; but, formally,

also as in Raymond, it must be subordinated almost entirely.
A More Liberal View: A.·c. Bradley, Marshall,
Veron, Parkhurst, Mather, Guerard, Listowel
With particular regard to the subject matter of art,
the following words of A.

c.

Bradley may be interesting:

"Again, it is surely true that we cannot
determine beforehand what subjects are fit
tor Art, or name any subject on which a good
poem might not possibly be written. To divide
ll. Rhys Carpenter, The Esthotio Basia of Greek Art of the Fifth

and Fourth Conturies B.c., Bryn Mawr College, 1921, P•

12. Ibid., P• 48.

13. ib!d. 1 P• 51.

47.
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subjects into two groups, the beautiful or
elevating, and the ugly or vicious, and ·to
judge poems according as their subjects belong to one ot these groups or the other, is
to fall into the same pit, to contuse with
our pre-conceptions the meaning or the poet •.
What the thing is,in the poem he is to be
judged by, not by the thing as it was before
. he touched 1t; and how can we venture to ·say
beforehand that he cannot make a true poem
out of something which to us was merely alluring or dull or revolting?" 14
.

~

Similarly, Eugene Veron's emotionalist theory quite
logically holds that '*art may depict evil and ugliness as
opposed to beauty and goodness.n

15

Tho worth or a work of

art, he writes, is derived trom the worth of the artist.
The beauty of an art-object is strictly a human creation;

and it may be derived from imitation, as

in the representa-

tive' arts, or not, as in music tor instance.

This

human~

created beauty is of such a kind that it may exist in ugliness insofar as the imitation of an ugly object is a work
Of

art, •• beautiful 1 1'by the ensemble' of· qualities Which

" 16
the com.position or it may prove are possessed by its author.
In short, tor Bradley and V'ron, it is the inter-

vention ot a personal equation between the object and its
representation that gives a work of art its degre·e of value.

14. Andrew Cecil Bradley, Poetrf for Poetry's Sake, quoted in
Carritt, .21?.•.2!1•• P• 215.
15e Rader, .!m.•.£!.l•• P• a~.
·
16. Eugene Veron, L'Esthetique, quoted ibid., p. 89.
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H. R. Marshall writes, "Ugliness is relatively
An~ disagr~eable

stable, or real, disagreeableness.

element "

may become part ot the field that is relatively stable.
:

call an object ugly which seems always to yield
,

.

.

'

We
I

~isagreeable-

17

'

ness 1n impression, or contemplative revival."
The gist or his

is that the judgment ·or

theo~y

beauty refera to a "tield" which is on the whole pleasant,
meaning not that it is composed

or

but that it is dominated by them.

all pleasant elements,

18

Works of art, he explains,

•

are not devoid ot ugliness; ugliness is found in the greatest
19

masters;
if,:_~ by:

.

.

the artist may use elements that are called "ugly",

the use of them, his work benefits, in added pleasure.
'

In the sreatost of literat_' ure
and in symphonic music,
.
.

20

we find

many minor uglinesses which· contribute to, rather than detract
21
from, the total beauty of the works.
We take this discussion to imply that ugliness ot
topic is not necessarily forbidden and that small, independent
uglinesses are not only legitimate but sometimes extremely
beneficial, since the beauty of a work of art is to be judged
with reference to a total impression.

Here, again, however,

ugliness can have no independent existenc.e in art, but must
be harmonized into the configuration.

17. Iienry·Rutgers

Marsh~ll,

18. :Ebid.; p. 101.
19. Ibid.; P• 100.
20. Ibid., PP• 101-102.
21. Ibid., p. 102.

.Ql?.•-ill••

p.· 79.
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Vlith Parkhurst, it is ; because the-natural.world
and humanity are full ot many unbeautitul
and ugly things,
r
>

.

that.the artist may concern himself with using them

"t~r

etteots ot grandeur, ot pathos, of irony, or tor

2

ot beauties concealed under unpropitious

the ~voking_

~xteriors."

The seemingly pedantic distinction between "unbeautitul" and "ugly" in the foregoing sentence is emphasized by
\

F. J. Mather, who points out that the opposite ot

beauty,~s

deoidedly·not the ugly but the unbeautitul, "the ununitied,
'

. 23

unharmonized; or merely neutral."

'

He cites and agrees with.

Stace that the aesthetically ugly may be an exceptional type

ot

beaut~,

artiticially Judged "ugly" because it is

' 24

untamil~ar.

Ugliness, Mather teals, is a moral rather than an aesthetic
category, abiding in associations and minds rather than in
things themselves.

"This", he writes, "is the realm ot the

ugly in esthetics.

It means simply that something is being

presented to us as beautiful which we think could not or ought
25
'
not to be so presented." In tact, he continues, the morally
ugly is not necessar111 excluded trom the realm ot.aesthetio
topics, but is, in taot, often made beautiful by art.
ugliness in an aesthetic judgment, is a result ot

Generally,

untamiliar~ty

22. Helen Huss Parkhurst, Beauty: An Interpretation ot Art and
the Imaginative Lite, London, l931 1 Noel Douglas, pp. 78-80.
23. ]'rank- Jewett Mather, Concerning Beauty, Princeton University
Press; 1935, p. 255.
-

24. Ibid., p. 256.

25. Ibid.-, P•' 256.

?9

or want of understanding; and the clearing up of these causes
?1111 remove the judgment ot diaval.ua. He points out,- with
reterenoe to this, that tho Latin word, nows, not onl1 means

2!

,

"now", but also "unlikely" c.nd "repellant"•
. No one, he says 1 oan draw the line where beauty ends

and ugliness begins:

"On the positive side, the ugly 1s l"lhat seems
monstrous or intolerable to anyone. There is
little uniformity 1n such Judgements, and progress in osthetio experience normally consists
in reolniming tor beauty much that one has earlier exoludod therefrom. The ugly then is merely what sticks painfully in our eathetio crop.
we may oough it up or get it down. If we get
it down, it will surprisingly often turn out
to hnvo as good nutritive quality as a.ny better
accredited beauty. The category ot ugliness
would bo on excellent basis tor an un1ntell1senoe test in eathet1os. In the length and
oharaoter of a list ot thinss and subjects written d<Tmi as inherently ugly, one would have a.
singularly accurate measure of the wr1tor•e
Philistinism." 27
In

,

a statement not unlike one ot Eugene Veron•s,

L

Albert Guerard tvr1 tes, "Art deals wl th the True• the Good,

and the.Beautiful, and 11kew1so with the revorse ot all three."
In these da1s, a touoh

ot various types of ugliness ls tho

only means we have or dist1ngu1sh1ng f 1na art from "oommero1e.l
dross"•

29

I'

Although Guerard seems to sense, and not without

Ibid., .p. 256.
fbfc!. • p. 257.

Albert Guerard, AFt tor Art's Sake, Boston and New York,
1936, Lothrop, Leo, and Shophara, P• 335.
Ib1d., P• 336.

26

BO

some bitterness, the

mode~

artist's flight from beauty, he

justifies his classification as liberal by the words:

n(Art)

is the venture beyond organized 'truth, beyond acknowleds,ed
,.

virtue, beyond recognized beauty • • •

Vlhoev~r
'

·.

looks primarily

to the true, the good, .2!. ~beautiful, is turning his back
. 30

on art." ·

The Earl of Llstowel, like Mather, begins by righting a wrong assumption, insisting that the opposite of beauty,
in ·the wide sense, is not ugliness, but the aesthetically in31
32
different.
For the ugly is really a species of the b~autiful.
He goes farther than most by saying, in black and white, that

the ugly

.!n

itself ia a prominent factor of the aesthetic ex-

p.erienoe and does not fail, as the aesthetically 1nd1f'ferent
33

would, in moving and attracting us.

The blending of the pain

that is provoked by the perception of ugliness, witll satisfaction, into a mixed feeling, he calla a product or the modern
34

spirit.

.
In the following quotation, we find him harking back

to a· very familiar straini
"(The·ugly object usually·portrays) • • • the
oddities, the ecoentr1o1ties, the foibles, the
whims,· that are the unmistakable·mark or individuality, the physical deformities, the moral tailings, the mental peculiarities, that distinguish
so clearly one person from· another; it expresses,
not the ideal generic type, but, in a word, the
chnraoteristic." 35

30. Ibid. I P• 338.
31. The Earl of Listowel, A Critical Historz of Modern Aesthetics,
London, 1933, George Allen and Unwln, p. 270.
.
32. Ibid., P• 108
33. Ibid., P• 270.
34. Ibid., P• 271.
35. Ibld. 1 P• 271.
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4.

Relativists on the Uglz: syn;ons, qollingw;ood, Ducasse,
~orossian, Boas, Ross, Furst, Reid
'

The word "relativists" may seem to tho
what ambiguous.

>

reader.some~

It is, granted• a rather arbitrary term.; and

its meaning in this case is simply that, in the opinion of
.

'

these authors, ugliness is never absolute and is
>

'

admissa~le

'

1n art, being merely a 3udgment relative to

~omething

else.

The following quotation trom. Symon's Studies in Seven Arts.
may serve as a prologue to the discussions
"What is ugliness in a picture? Manet's
pictures used to be called ugly; a woman;in
a tub, drawn by Degas, used·to be called ugly,
because the woman was naked, and not •nude'. ·
Goya would certainly be called ugly is he were
not Spanish - and dead. Every well-bred lady
still thinks Daumier ugly." 3&
Here, in these very possible instances, we have ugli•
ness relative to
tive to deathl

morals~

convention, nationality - even

rela~

With Collingwood, ugliness is relative, 1n a

sense, to the imagination; with Boas, Ross, and Ducasse, to
the spectator; with Furst, to rhythm and unity.
Art is ima.gination,.says Colling\'vood; and it attempts
to achieve beauty. Therefore, "the beautiful is neither.more
nor loss than the imagined."

37

,

..

Suoh a beginningwould logically·

36. Arthur· Symons, Studies in Seven Arts, New York, 1925 1
Dutton, P• 313•. ·
··
37. R. Ge Collingwood, Outlines of a·PhilosophY ot Art, London,
1935 1 .oxrord Universlty Press, p. 19.
·
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lead us to the dubious oonolusion that nothing ugly oan ever
appear to anyone; for it 'would not

be

possible to lnlagine .·

anything not beautiful. · This may seem outrageous, the author
admits; but it is, nevertheless, true.

For nothing is ever

purely ugly but always mixed with beauty 1 whose presence ·makes
ugliness possible. Ugliness is relative because it is all
beauty that is somehow trustrated or Spoiled.

"All ugliness

. 38

is beauty spoilt, beauty uglified.tt
The fact ot its extreme relativity he illustrates

by an example of music, where the ugliness of a wrong note
undeniably depends on the right notes; because the "wrong"
note would be right in another key. Ugliness, to repeat,·is
spoiled beauty; but it presupposes a beauty to be spoiled;
"and when (ugliness) has oompletelr destroyed this beauty it
ceases to be ugliness and starts fair, so to speElk, with a
ohanoe of achieving a new beauty of.its

own."

39

Further, Collingwood seems to tie up his position
by hinting at a note not unlike that· or Croce and Gent1ie,
when he says that ugliness, insotar as it exists, is not that

ot an object imagined but of one not imagined or halt-imagined,
~ust

as error is not absence ot thought but contused thinking.
A not unusual sort ot relativism is retleoted 1n

Ducasse:

36. Ibid~; p. 20.
39. Ibid.9 P• 20.
40. f'6Ia., p. 20.

40
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"The most 001m11on form of critioism of works
of art is oritioism in terms of beauty and ugliness'• The terms beautiful and ugly, however,
have no meaning whatever in terms of the creating
artist's point of view ·but only in terms of the
spectator or t consumer I 1 whether he be the artist
himself later contemplating and evaluating his
creation, or some one else. That which is evaluated in terms of beauty and ugliness is therefore not at all the work ot art as such, viz.
as product of the artist's endeavotir·to give
his feelings embodiment in an object, but only
the object itself that the spectator contemplates,
and wholly without reference to the question
whether that object is a product of art or ot
nature." 41

·42
"Many works of art are ugly",
writes Ducasse.

By

these he means works from.which we get more displeasure than
pleasure, works such as are generally consciously overlooked.

so why call them "works ot art"? Because, even though the
creator may admit the ugliness of his creation, he may say it
.

'

was not meant to . be beauty but, rather, the expression ot some.

ttiing w1 thin him. His v1ork may be as seriously- undertaken as
a thing one would call beautiful - proceeding trom the same
·43

impulse and presupposing the same skill.

.

Duoasse s general
1

answer is summed up in three statements Which he italicizes:
"The artist aims not at beauty- but at objective self-expression;"
"The deliberate creating ot beauty is not art"; and "If a thing
.

is a work ot art, it remains so.

41.

c. J.

45

But beauty comes and goes."

Ducasse, The Philosophy of Art, quoted in Carritt,

. £!!.•.ill•. p.

313. .

'

'

42. Curt John Ducasse; The Philosophy ot Art, New York, 1929,
Dial Press, P• 16.
43. Ibid., P• 17.

44. Ibio., P• 18.

45.

1hta.,

P· 19.

44

That the standards ot terminal value are located
46'

in the individual 1s also the opinion of Boas.

Taste, he

says. can never be wholly aesthetic, being the result.of
47
.
both approval. and liking,
and
being
relative
to
the
oiroum•
.
,
'

stances under Which the judgment ooours. He is writing with
.

'

wisdom when he says, "One might lay down as the first

pr~oiple

ot the histor7 of taste - moral taste as well as aesthetic
and group as well as ·individual - the ne.oessi ty of the habit. 48

ual."
The reasons tor disagreement. over the jud8IJlent of

an art-object will fall under four possible oonditions, says
Ross.

~e

person alone may be right.

right, while the

firs~ ~a

or the other alone

experiencing some non-aesthetic

emotion, or according value or disvalue with reference to
convention or someone else's opinion.

or both may be wrong,
'

making mistakes of the first two types.
right.

It is this last

as a relativist; tor

ciroumst~oe

he~aays,

or both may be

which olassit'ies Ross

in view of how inertrioablY'

beauty is oonneoted with sense - perception; and in view of
how this, in turn, is dependent upon sense-organs which d1tter
markedl1 among individuals - in view of these

46.
·
47.
48.

things~

the same

George Boas, A Primer for Critics, Baltimore, 1937,.Johns
Hopkins Press, p. l 7.
Ibid., P• 142.
Ibfci., P• 142.

85

object ma1:produoe true aesthetic satisfaction or repulsion

tn such a case, ot course, that

1n ditterent individuals.

objeo·t is both beautiful, and ugly; and this notion can clearly not be excluded as impossible.

Here,

Ross becomes a

little dldaotio and advises that we revise our notions

or

beauty and ugliness; because, he says, by- the popular use
Of

these terms,

Via surely
·49

mean attributes VIDiOh cannot belong

to the same thing. ·

It is suttioient to touch upon Furst with a tairlyconolusive quotation:

"The only aesthetioal qual1t1estt,'.he

writes, "are rhythm and unity: it does not matter or what
un1tY; this rhythm is composed, so long as a unity is achieved.

Tht!re 1s 1 therefore, no style that is beautitul, no style that
.

'

is

ugly~

'because lacking rhythm and unity, it would not be a

. 50,

style."

·

.

Though this does not indicate what is his realm ot
possibilities tor subject matter, we might infer that it
would not matter so long

~s

they are conducive to, .or amen•

able to. rhythm and unity. His

g~neral

tone seems to lay

the greatest weight upon the formal aspect of art.
Torossian divides beauty into romantio, realistic,
'
·51
and olasaio; tragio and comic; and easy and dittioul.t.

49:. Vlilliwn· David Ross, ·:r'he R_ight and tho Good, quoted in
· Carritt.· .212..oit., P• 319.

50. Herbert Furs~Art Debunked, New York, 1936, Dutton, p. · 97.
51. Aro.m Toross1an, A Guide to Aesthetics,, California, 1937,
Stanford Un1vors!ty Press, p. 258.
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Following Bosanquet, and not unrelated to Mather, his discussion ot dittioult beauty brings a good deal ot light to bear
on aesthetic ugliness.
.

Not. only is difficult beauty that

'Which is unusual, shocking, and overtaxing; but it is really
a quality ot beauty which oan give us a deeper aesthetic
satistaotion than more taoile beauty.

52

(We are reminded of

Mather's "esthetio crop").
Ditt1cult beauty differs from easy . beauty .in
degree
.
and is thus, relative to individual judgment, "the degree ot
~

easy or difficult beauty (being) directly proportional to
the appreoiator•s range ot perception, experience, and emo63

tional sensitivity."
~ount

.

The

~dividual,

.

lacking an adequate

of these qualities to enable his grasping ot dlttioult

beauty, calls it ugly, and not because ot any inherent aes-

thetio detect in the art-object.

our

54

judgment ot beautiful or ugly will generally

rall into one of three categories.
~.

o.

.

(Note the relation

Bradley). Either we are judging, with

genui~e

t~

aesthetic

naight, the success ot the values perceived and expressed by
'he

creator.

Or more probably, we are judging with reference

.) our own awareness ot the Values themselves which we perceive
'l

legitimate judgment it identified with the object and not

. ·-·· Ibid~' p. 271.
~ • Ibid.; p. 271 •
• Ibid., p. 273.

67

ourselves),

or, with a completely illegitimate

word "ugly", :we

are expressing
our
·55

~se·of

the

own feelings as stimulated

by the objeot perceived.
Torossian•s relativism is well

1~lustrated

by the

following statement: .·
"Thus, while beauty, in the ordinary sense,
is limited to things which stimulate the pleasant
sensations and are easily peroeived9·,.,.the field
ot aesthetic beauty is almost unlimited. our·
survey ot dittioult beauty has revealed that
many aspects of our peroept1ve·world, particular•
ly the paintul and the teartul, which are otten
called ugly, may become intensely beautitul when
aesthetioally·treated. In other words, any subject matter may be the theme ot art and will become beautiful to us it we can react to it ~esthetioally 1 reeling satisfied with;the matter
56
expressed and with the r;i.anner ot its expression.~
When we come to Reid, we may note a kinship between
his notion and those ot Croce and Gentile,- especially when,
Reid says, "Beauty, according to the assumption we have been
making, is just perfection of expression; ugliness is some
failure or bretlkdown or obstruction ot expression. And as

we have seen, there are, in some sense, degrees in. these things."
It is also possible that this expression, thOUSh
present,

mar

tail to be well

o~ganized,

or that "one kind ot

beaut1, so ta.r complete 1n itself, jars with another kind.in·
a larger whole."

Ibid•· pp.

58

27~29.

fbiCi. • p. 274.
·
touls.Al1laud Reid, A Study in Aesthetics, London, 1931 1
George Allen and Unwin, p. 217.
Ibid.' p. 220.
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ea

Reid's general ,,thes1s· 1s.·:that the aesthetic object,
a unit ot the content and the body in which it appears, ms.y
be spoken ot as the. "embodiment"..

The character of thettembod;..

/

7

iment" may vary according to the

nat~e

•

or 1ts parts, the

relative importance ot one taotor or another, or the thorough.

()9

ness or laok ot thoroughness 1n the :tusion.

How this
Reid~s

is iinportant can be seen with re:t'erenoe to

ana~ysis

aesthetic

concepts o:t' perfection and 1mperteot1on. His opinion is that
the tendency ot contemporary theory is to deny the distinction
between beauty and ugliness by saying, "It any body; however
hideous it appears to us,, can appear eXpressive to someone

else,. how have 'beautiful• and 'USlY' any objective meaning?"

60

In the course of Reid's discussion,· a number ot

questions

are raised: May solliething be intrinsically incapable

ot appearing expressive to anz;.imagination? .Is tb,e burden ot
expressiveness to rest completely on the "imaginative mind-andbody"?

"Can imaginative mind-and-body do anything aesthetically

.

.

with such things as trashy poems, pictures, tunes,._suburban
.

.

Villas?" And, if anz body oan be expressive, what does finally
.

.

happen to the diotinotion between beauty and ugliness?
answers:

61

He

No 1 nothing is 1ntr1nsioally incapable of expressive•

nessJ and Yes, the burden is to be thrown on the "imaginative

59• Ibid •• p. 203.
p. 207.
61 •. fb!d~, P• 209.

&o. Ibid.;

89

mind-and-body." His answer, in part, which gives his

is quoted heres

reason~,

·'

"MU.oh of cours~ that appears ugly appears
so because it is; to begin with at least, too
difficult tor us, and· we wrongly suppose that
the artist has failed; whereas it 1s ourselves.
or perceiving a thing as really expressive, we.
may condemn it tor some non-aesthetic reason
such as that it suggests something unpalatable
or unpleasant." 62
· ·
Already Reid oan be oonvioted of a vaguenesa which
may eventually render his theory comparatively worthless. He
has answered. the question that any object oan be .aesthetically
.treated; but a more important question he has left U.Uanswered.
'

He has not said directly whether there is any real ditferenoe 1
,.

:,.

'

;

1

'

arid what 1s this difference, between a good painting ot an

.

ugl1 natural object and e. poor painting of

object.

an

ugly natural

In warning us against non•aesthetio judgment, he

I

has even contused the tinal·values of poems and suburban
villas.

Croce, whom Reid seems to follow
to a certain extent,
..
.. ·

comes closer to the answer when he says that there are no
ugly objects in nature; but that there oan' be, an·d. are, ugly
portrayals ot these beautiful obJeots.

Reid goes turther than

Croce and runs into a very contusing and vague sort ot objective relativism.

This is indioated as he spe'aks of the moot line between beauty and ugliness:

62. Ibid., p.·211.

90

,
"The distinction between beauty and ugliness
· does not disappear because beauty and ugliness
,depend upon meanings imagined by some particular
mind with its particular history and experience,
and because, therefore, no perceptual object
oan aesthetically be condemned absolutely. If
Beauty is perfection of expressiveness, and Ugli•
ness is failure in expressiveness, then, it any
body really appears to·· any· mind to be perfectly
expressive ot meaning • • • • ,then here is real
beauty, though· there be but one mind in the world
which sees 1t,so. The same applies, mutatis
mutandis, to ugliness. Beauty and uglliiess are
real an~ objective notions, real and objective
qualities, distinct from one another and never
identical. The tact that·the very same 'body•
may appear to X as •ugly', and to Y as 'beautiful',
makes no difference whatever to the real existence of real ugliness and real beauty in the one
case and 1n the other.n 63
·
Again, to compare Reid with Croce .... Crooe has Sfiid

that there are degrees ot ugliness, but not ot beauty. Reid
says that, considering beauty in the sense .ot perfection,
logioally there can be no degrees; and yet there may be degrees

ot approximation to it. However, since he reels such a tenet
.
.
.
too pedan:tio, he says that we may, popularly speaking, admit ,
degrees of beauty or pertection and ot ugliness or imperteotion,
in the sense that we regard beauty as an ideal.

And 1n this

sense, ugliness has no meaning apart from a relation.to beauty.
It is not an absolute, negative ideal; tor, defined 1n relation
to beauty, ugliness cannot be absolute. A concept or absolute
,

ugliness would be·beyond the aesthetic realm.

64

And ugliness

91

does tall within the aesthetic in that it involves some degree
,

ot expressiveness and some degree ot beauty.
~eid

65

is, in a sense, a culmination ot the growing

relativism in the contemporary period; and this relativism
seems to . be the only reall1 original contribution ot these
'

~

thinkers; ot course, this is original only in the sense that
it is more extreme than what we have seen betore.
'

this group is composed ot eclectic people who
ing

We

mar

As a whole,
be interest-

only in that they recall other more important philosophers.

mar

grant, with tho relativists, that there is no distinction

between beauty and ugliness in natural objects, but we vdll
not grant the absence ot distinction between a beautitul end
an ugly poem.

This confusion, well illustrated 1n Reid• seems

to render the group rather worthless and, on the whole, less
satisfactory than an1 group that has been discussed betore.
For after all, it one is a real relativist, he will laok standards tor beauty as well as for ugliness.

65. Ibid. t P• 219.
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CHAPTER VI

ARTISTIC TRENDS O:F THE PAST AND PRFSENT
"Reeling and Writhing, ot course, to
begin with", the Mook Turtle replied,
"and the·ditterent branches ot Arithmetic Ambition; Distraction, Uglification• and
Derision."
,.

. 1. Trends ot the Past
The reasons tor including a chapter on oontempor-

ar1 art are.two.

:First, this is a period 1n which much work

ot an esoteric
nature is being . created, work which br the
.
layman is, more often than not, called "US11"• And second,
with any theoretical topic.,_it is always valuablE! and interesting to see how it pertains to a contemporary period.
Reactions to this period or "abstraction" and
"distortion" are varied.

Some, naively admitting it is all

quite incomprehensible to them, say it is ugly.
since it

1~

.

Others,

the "modern" art, atteot a taste tor it and an

understanding.

And a m1nority 1 which probabl1 includes the

artists themselves, find it trul1 expressive and "beautiful"
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1n that sense. However• it is not at all a

strio~lf

modern

problem, but was probably much the same as tar back as when
Pausanias wrote• "All the works ·of Daedalus are somewhat .
odd to look at, but there is a wondertul 1l'lspiration about
. l

them."

.

.

And it is no immediate novelty, certainly, for in

1920 1 Jacques Maritain pointed out the same

obs~rvation

that is used to criticize the artists ot 1942 ·- that the
boldest ot contemporary art then was an effort to attain
those things which characterized primitive art in respect
to "s1mplio1ty1 candour, and rationality of the means, in
.

.

.

' 2

the ideographioal schemat1sat1on of expression."
A cross section of public opinion is illustrated

bf the man who said all modern literature was "either erotic,
neurotic, or Tomm.yrot1o."

3

But before we condemn any phase ot art, conclusively and dogmatically, we should at least allow ourselves to
experience enough ot it with unbiased eyes. There are some
critics who, having done so, still condemn it; there are
others who enjoy it and attempt to explain it.

Despite the

tact that we may believe art should be immediately enjoyed,

.

1. Frank p. Chambers I Cycles of Taste:· An Unacknowledged.
Problem in Ancient Art and Critlo!sm, Cam.bridge, 1928,
· Harvard university Press, PP• 42-43.
2. Jacques Maritain, Art and Soholasticism,·translated by
· J. F. Scanlan, New York and London, 1930, p. 217.
·
3. Dan1el·GregoryUason 1 Artistic Ideals, New York, 1927,

Norton, p. 109.
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demanding no commentary;to aohieve its ettect, we should,at
least, know what is the motive and goal of the oontemporaryartists

~

remembering that in past eras, the "modernistic"
'

.

.

.

has usually been called ugly betore it became the usual. ·
.

'

"It is interesting to note, (writes John
Fry-) that the hatred and negation ot beauty
of the barbarians and Puritans which expressed
itself in the mutilation and destruction of
Greek and Latin culture, called forth a different manifestation ot the same spirit.in
modern times. With the exception ot an explosion· in the Reformation, and later in the
French Revolution, the negation and hatred
ot beauty in modern times has taken the torm
·ot creating,! cult of deformation." 4'
so, conscious attempts at ugliness, through the
negation ot beauty, are round in the ancient world also.
The 1nst1not tor the grotesque is seen 1n the medieval
·5

cathedrals with their monsters and devils.

It is seen 1n

..,

Shakespeare's Falstatt, Bardolph, Pistol, Caliban, in his
witches, and others; in Dante's hell; in n\irer.

There is·

:- /

.

what Fry calls real ugliness 1n Cezanne and Ga'UgUin, because
6

they have eliminated the element ot imagination; . and "the
total destruction ot the imagination is a neoessary prelude
to absolute ugliness."

7

The sadistic impulse which generates

so much artistic ugliness abounds in Wilde, SWinburne,
.

'

.

.

d'Annunzio, Baudelaire, Matisse, Zola, Van Gogh, Picasso,

John H. Fry, .i?l?.•.!?.!!• 1 P• 25.
5• Ibid;; P• 129.
,

4•
69

Ibid.; Pe 130.

7. Ibid., P• 131.
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and so man1. others.

Fry'

explains . this trend towards ugl1•

noos by saying:
"The oosm1c evil is incarnate in.the vol1•
.tion ot the 1nter1or mind. It 1s e'Ver aotive
and destruotive. It has ariaon ana.·aestroyod
all tormer cultures. The advent of the modernist~ cult 1n the arts was a revolt ot the interior
mind against the-inhlbitlons and standards set
by superior minds in the arts." e
In the long history of aesthetics, we eh.all generally f'1nd art judgment linked with morality, with a corres-

ponding judgment ot ugliness where the art•obJeot touohes

upon immorality ot any kind. A very brief review of this

history my serve to looate better our problem tor the contemporary period. With the Renaissance, there was a revival

ot the aesthetic oonsotousness which had been suppressed or.
'
9
ignored 1n early Christian and medieval times. Olassioism

omerged trom the Renaissanoe and became eventually.41st1n•

.

'

gu1shed by a moral prinoiple, a tendency towards ideaUsm,
end a legislative

pr1no1~1e.

The moral prinolple was embodied

1n a reb±tllh ot the sooratio "uso and beautytt 410.tum, 8Ild 1n

a rerl:ve.1 of .the Aristotelian notion ot "oathars1.ett. Art be10

omto, theorettoallY', a tto1v111z1ng and ret1n1ns agent", con.
11
corned only with the noblest ot subject matter. Ir;i this
poriod, at first, veracity was tho standard; myth and

8 • .nM. 1 P• 160.
9. Y:P. ·Chambers, Historz at Taste, PP• 28-29.
io.·
PP• 55-ea.
·
ii.
•• P• eo.

!§H••
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met point morals& 1t was a period ot exaot hdtat1on ot only
' 12
goo4 and beautiful things. This led, t1nally1 to a compro-

mise, from which came tho 1doal1zat1on of nature, which was, ·
13
'
'
admittedl.S', detective. In these tlm.es, taste was regarded
au definable and infallible.

l.4 '
There was no relativism about

either the .creation or the enjoyment ot art-obJects. In41•
v14ual senius was suppressed.

15

In the period ot

Romantio1~,

however, the character and temperament and 1nd1v1dual1ty of
'

the artist was prized.

18

And, in contrast with the Class!•

o!sts, there was en antithesis of reason and 1mag1nat!on1
.

.

'

tor art should be telt and not 3udged.

1'1

.

The Romentlo cult

found morality irrelevant and even at times obstructive to
their purposes. They loathed the mathema.t1oal procedure

ot the Claas1o1sta1 Romanticism was lawless, independent,
·,

imag1nat1ve 1 and passionate.

18

.

'

'

'

But, despite all this, writes

John Fr11

"The Romantic cult made the oh1et end end
aim of' thoir art the expression of passion,
but with all the licenao involved.in the ex•
pression ot this passion their work never de•
generated into ugly' torms. In tha most intense
and tragic ot their pictures the disposition
of masses and 11noa was well balanced, harmonious and virile with plastic povrer
. • • •"
. 19

9'1

It was w1th the New Realism in the nineteenth ,
century that the elements,of unpleasantness and ugliness
become conspicuous, notably in the "eccentric" Baudelaire.
This tendency is expressed in the words of their
tive artists.

O\nl

20

crea-

Courbet says; "The basis of realism 1s the

negation of the ideal and all that the ideal means •. By that
the tull deliverance ot his
21
reason, of the individual and at last of demooraoy."
negation alone can man

atta~

Rodin says: "The beautiful in art is simply the
oharaoteristio; character is the intense truth of any sight
or scene of nature; • • • everything in nature is beautiful
. '
22
.
1n the eyes of the true artist."
Hugo says: "It the poet
must choose his subjects, and he ought to choose his sub•
.

.

jeots, let him not choose the beautitul, but the oharacter23

1stio."

'I'hen 1 with its beginning in realism, there came
the period of the Impressionists, in whom, says Chambers,

the subject matter was most often unrecognizable, but when

it was, sometimes suggested ugly and revolting associations.

And in what is known as the post-Impressionistic period, the
tendency was towards the pure beauty ot form.

20~
21~

22.

23•

24•

25.

Chambers, Historl ot Taste, P• 201.
Courbet, quoted n ibid., p. 202.
Rodin• quoted 1n ibid•• p. 202.
Hugo, quoted in ibid., p. 202.
Chambers, Historl of Tast~, p. 206.
Ibid., p. 211.

25

· · ,

24
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Looking back, we can see the reasons

tor,~udg1ng

art "ugly" 1n these different periods; and tho judgment will
be found not too consistent but Vfill vary with the artistio
standards of the time.

For instance, Classical standards

would pronounce "ugly" any artistic depiction ot immorality,
perversion of truth, and ugly subject matter.

Romanticism

would surely call Classicism "ugly", or at least "boring."
Intellectual, rational and moral-pointing art would be· bad
art in their eyes, ae it would be excellent tor the Olassioiats. And finally, any tendency to idealize nature or any
.

.

deliberate choice of beauty1 qua beauty, would be scorned
by

the New Realists.

Probably to their public, their works

seemed ugly because, in the effort to avoid the conscious
use ot beauty in the ordinary sense, the New Realists may
have appeared to acoent the ugly.
2.

Contemporarz Art: Condemned bt Me.son and :r. Fry:
No better sentence than the one below can be found

to express the general impressions ot the conventional publio
to the moro extreme phases ot art today:
"(There is) •• • the insistenoe that everything should be strikingly different from anything we have seen or heard before: that language
should make strange nonsense rather-'than sense,
that visual forms· in painting·and sculpture
should be swollen, dislocated, distorted, that
musio ~hould sound queer and ugly, that, 1n short,
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everything.should be generally upside down,
wrong side to, and baok side before." 26
With these words, Mason condemns what he calls the
pseudo-originality of.modern art with its incessant demand,
not tor beauty at all, but tor novelty.
In his book, The Revolt Against Beauty• John Fry '

has a rather amusing chapter entitled "The Gospel ot Ugliness •
according to Mephistopheles."

In it, he says that Buddhistic

ascetioiem is the f 1rst rung in the ladder ot negating beauty
because beauty is one ot the most potent attractions ot the
·27

material world.

Speaking as Mephistopheles, he says that

science•s reign has been one
· 20

tion ot beauty.

or

his chief means in the nega-

He continues: ·
''The third form ot my triad ot Negations
is to be round in the peculiar manitestation
or the •modernistic' neurotic cult ot art expressed through the medium ot sculpture, painting, and poetry. ·r.A:y partiality·tor this special
cult is the proof ot my esthetio taste. Its
propaganda has steadily developed since the days
ot my pupil, the Marquis de Sade, who was the
prophet ot the cult. I·have seen it grow in
Paris, spread to London, Berlin, and other centers of taste and culture 1n Europe, and I am.
encouraged to believe that my cult of degenerate art has now a tirm foothold in America." 29

All the devotees of this modernistic cult are united

26•
279
289
29.

D. G. Mason, 9.1?.•cit., p. 109.
J. H.·Fry-, .Ql?.•.£ll•t p. 195.
Ibid.; P• 200~
:tbfct., P• 202.
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. "(a)' unanimous consent in a common worship
It ugliness. Their test or standard, of highest
exoellenoe in art is to achieve the intensest
possible negation of form and proportion, and
th~ greatest conceivable ugliness. coupled with
symbolic suggestions· of sexomania in pioturea,
statuary·or alleged poetry. There is a walldefined oabal1st1o code of sign language employed, whereby initiates can understand and
experience the,sensa~ions conveyed." 30.
Speaking for him.Salt• Fry continues his bitter·
condemnation of modern art., This negation

or

the cosmic

order and beauty has its genesis 1n the 1ndustrialrevolu•
tion (the Machine Age and the environment of ugliness), and
.
'

in demooraoy, which, vdth its "Levelling gospel, destructive

Of'oreativa genius, has brought chaos into the domain of
31
aesthetics."
Ha calls the machine a symbol of abstraction,
and the development of interest in abstraot!on is a development in annihilating form.

Just· how bitter is his aristo- ,

oratio renunciation of our art may be seen in the impassioned
sentences following:

"Mass produot1on is the abstraction

ot the individual in the mass. To .m1x·a11 the colors of the
'

.

palette in a mass is to destroy the individual beauty of eaoh
individual oolor; result: abstraction
. 32

this 1s democracy.ff

or

all oolora1 mud; .

And also: nThe reign of universal

ugliness must react on the passions, the emotions, the impulses and tastes.of.our people• to reduce them all to an
•·
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average.dead level ot inertia which is the ultimate triumph

ot the machine age and its handmaiden Democracy."

33

Having gone this tar, it might be interesting to
turn back and determine just what Fry means to indicate by
aesthetic ugiiness.

Ugly movements in art, he explains,

are sudden and unexpected turns, sharp rectangles• a high
.

.

.

degree ot indefiniteness, 1rregnlarity, disorder, great
.

.

eitort and difficulty, little ease, roughness, antagonism,
..

"54

and other rather obscure terms.

,.

Also didactic art and

that which is made tor poli tioal and religious propaganda
·35

is immediately ugly, as illustrated by soviet art.
The processes ot negation in the "neurotic cults"

ot contemporary art lio in a disease manitest in extreme .
36

.

The decay ot beauty,
37
often parallel to "spiritual bankruptcy."

contusion, disbalance, and disorder.
he says,

1~

There are tour main divisions ot .American art today, Fry points out.

There is surface designing such as in

advertising, the oom1o strips, and painting.

seoondlyt there

is the "stage", consisting
of legitimate drama, musical
comedy,
.
.
and the movies.

Thirdly, there is literature suoh as, in hi9

words• tabloids and sensational press, art oritioism and
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38

current 'tiotion. And lastly• there is music and the dance.·
Of this last. his book (written 1n 1934) says: . :"In ·America
.
.
. 39

we have only one da.noe, the jazz."

.And he continues:·

n1 do not attack the jazz musio and the
dance on the grounds ot bourgeois immorality.
I leave that question tor the specialists in
morals. My detestation ot the jazz music and
de.nae arises from 'm.'1' hatred ot ugliness; from
11J3° standpoint ugliness is sin; viewed· in this
way, the jazz dance is immoral. Then, the
jazz music and the dance are degrading two
ot the noblest arts·down to the lowest level 40
of human ignorance, stupidity and obscenity."

There are three prime stimuli which have caused
the people to take to these modernistic art torms: the old
band-wagon device, by which the majority are

~ttraoted

to

a. tad; a rather universal and tt1rres1st1ble congenital urge
.
41

ot a sadistio instinct for mutilation"; and greed.

"The

de1tioat1on ot. ugliness and ..obsoenity" 1 he writee, "the urge
tor mutilation, deformation, muddy color and exaggeration,
are all symptoms ot sadism• indicating a form ot psycopathia-"
. 42

sexualls,"
3.

Conte:qporar;z Art:

E,xplained by: Danz and Read

Fry•s bitter oondemnation should be lett to the
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experts to attack. However• we cannot let such an, energetic

and depressing account go completely
unanswered.
.

Before
at'

tempting to remove a tew ot the rather unnecessary· stigmata
he has attached to modern art, we shall see how Danz and Read,
viewing the same topic, approach it less emotionally and with
less disastrous conclusions.
The surrealists speak ot something as being "as
beautitul as the chance meeting on a dissecting table ot a
43

sewing machine and an umbrella."

.

Despite this rather out-

rageous definition ot beauty, Louis Danz undertakes to give

a fairly sympathetic interpretation of modernistic art, with
·emp.~asi~ on painting.
The Surrealist, he -says, 1s a noun
painter. He paints only things and is about as interesting
'

·44

as a person who uses only nouns.

OUr revulsion at such

painting he explains in the words:
"Things arranged 1n dis-arrangement require foreknowledge or literary explanation
to be understood, andl when we ~re shocked
or entertained by a p cture in which things
are arranged in dis-arrangement, a picture
in which things which are usually associated
in certain arrangements with other things are
irrationalized into d1s•arrangement 1 we are
outside the realm ot painting art. The picture may be well painted, but the meaning of
this kind of picture cannot be expressed
through·paint. Meaning does not lie in·orattsmanship. No matter how well it is done, it

43. Herbert Read, Art Now: An Introduction to the·Theory of

Modern Painting and sculpture, New York, 1933, Haro.ourt 1
Brace, pp.·14-95
44. Louis Danz, The·Psicholosist Looks at Art, New.York, 1937,
Longmans, Green, pp. 14-15.
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would be vii thout painting•art•meanings; but
it would have literary-art-meaning • and, at
that, unexpressed." 45
It is the Freudian ·concept ot dreams which has

given rise to the strange quality of SUrrealism.
logic~lly speak~,

46

Psycho•

this art is a form ot eidetic imagery,

wh!oh, visually, means the projection of an image after the
initial stimulus is removed or when there has been no stimu. ·47

lus.

' surrealism, he feels, is not chaos and disorder, as

it seems, but is merely the absence ot one kind ot order and
'48

the presence of another.

.

Salvador Dali, well-known exponent

ot surrealistic art says, "The new images ot Sur-realism
must come more and more to take the forms and colors of de· 49

moralization and confusion"•
justification to Fry's

.

a statement which would give

c~ndemnation.

Because SUrrealistio art is nothing but simple and
unadulterated ugliness to most of us, it 1s well to note
Danz•s interpretation of different phases of modern art •
..

Art, he says, is really a behavioral world, treating forces,
.

50

as opposed to the geographical world, which treats things.
Things can be arranged; and arrangement belongs to the geographical world, not to the world of

45. Ibl4•t pp. 15-16.
46• !bid~. p. 17-18.
47.

Ibid.;

p. 25-26.

48• Ibid•, P• 33•
49. baiI,·quoted; ibid., p. 31.
50. Ibid., P• 64.

art~

And so, this
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behavioral world has not arrangement but organization.

51

Form,

which means, "an expressive organic whole", denotes organization. Form is embodiment

or

the principle that the whole

is greater than the sum of its parts.
Danz speaks

52

ot what he calls "the referential

artist", lying between two poles - those ot representative
art and that art which is pure abstraction and form.

53

"The

l

referential artist does not relate one thing to another.
He relates one reference to another.

His lines, colors.

and shapes are organized; they are not arranged representa.

tions ot thing.

54

Every art act is a structural act."

The art ot the subconscious deals with subject
matter, representation of thingj. The art ot the unconscious
'
55
deals with structure. From this level comes the "Form-Art."
"Art is a biological event • • • A work or art is
the extension ot the artist's neural structure into spaoetime • • • The artist extends his neural structure into pio•
ture, music, architecture."

56

Perhaps this apparent digression does not seem to
.-

pertain directly to our problem. However, 1t is 1 included in
the beliet that it does, and in the hopes that we may obtain
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some knowledge of the point ot departure in the artist who
paints what is to us.pure ugliness.
Herbert Read, like Danz, 'relates some ot modern

art to Freudianism.

The confusion-which Da.11 speaks of is
•

I

brought in again:
"(It is) to be achieved by an imitation
of the illogical.·and unpredictable nature
of dream-imagery. The painter, like the ·
literary painter of all times, like Dreughel
and Bosoh 1 like Van Eyck and Rembrandt, will
paint natural objects with great care and
verisimilitude; but he will never bring together · objeots which a.re normally seen togather. He will seek to bring about the most
unexpeoted 1 the most shocking and awe-inspiring
encounters between contrary images • ~- •" 57
This is spoken, primarily, of painting; bUt- it is
·59

the same with poetry;

and parallels may be found in music 1

in the atonal music of Schonberg, Alban Berg, Anton Webern,
and.in literature, such as the interior monologue of Joyoe•s
59
Ulysses,
In whatever departments of art, the etfeot is
aoh16!ed by extreme subjectivity; " •• • the artist, 1n
short, becomes a man gifted with the oapaoity to projeot
.•

.. .

60

symbols trom his suboonsoious • • • "
We saw that Jacques Maritain likened modern art
to pr1m1tive.

This genetic approach, in Read, shows us that

the direct and positive character of ohildren•s art has had
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a great intluenoe on the contemporary artist.

"There has

been a deliberate attempt to reaoh'baok to the naivety anc1.
61

or

fresh simplioity

the childlike·· outlook • • •

tt

..

And -

provided the children do not belong to us - we are inolined
to pronounce their drawines extremely crude and ugly. Matisse
has what critics call the ."pre-logical vision" ot children's

·ea

art.

Read writes:
" • • • There is bad symbolism and good
symbolism, and though good symbolism will.
never Justiry·a picture devoid ot purely .
aesthetic values, yet granted these·aesthetio
values' good symbolism will prolong, deepen,
and give signit'ioanoe to the pleasure we de•
rive trom. a pioture. Let us grant, however,
that this concrete symbolism of the image•
conveying kind is an extremely dangerous language to usei th.at only the profoundest minds
are capable or-using it: that nothing is more
desperately boring and distastetul than the
misuae of it." 63
But there is some beauty in modern art.

" • • • ' We·

like it as we might like a.strange fungus, an orohid, a cloud. 64

formation, a vein in marble."
4.

On

the Critics and the Criticized ·

Perhaps it is expedient to return, tor a moment, to

Fry. In the first plaoe, the most obvious criticism is that

61. Ibid.; P• 45•

!bict.; P• eo.
132~
129.
!010.,
64.
P•

62~

63. Ibid.; P•

-

108

he is entirely too emotional, too alarmist, and too strongspoken.

Can anything really be as bad as it soemn to him?

One almost turns to the defense ot the· art· because of.the
.

extreme intensity

or

the or1t1o.

Granted that there does exist a cult which.worships
ugliness, qua ugliness, (which we will not.grant), it is
''

not correspondingly true that there has been a total destruction or imagination.
exact opposite.

It might, rather, appear to be the

And is there really a common worship ot ug-

liness, is our world universally possessed with sadistic,
mutilating imyulses?

or,

even granted that, can
we take
,.,

what is merely an offshoot ot our art to be a thermometer
ot our general spiritual.condition?

What of his divisions of art?

Do they not seem

to come from a rather bitter and biased pen?

And the ener-

getic condemnation of our dance and our nmsio? We will dis-

miss mue1o by saying that we do have good musiu, and jazz
music is not representative of· it.

But even it we admit

that the jazz dnnoe is the only dance ot America, we must
note that even the jazz dancers do not call it beautitul
or art.
1n

It aims at \'>eing neither.

Perhaps unfortunately

Mr. Fry's eyes, it is our folk dance; the folk dance,

when

~eautitul,

is that only accidentally.

Always it is

characteristic of spontaneous feelings before it is ret1ned
and crystallized into tine art.
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Finally it seems rather :tutile an:1 unneuessary
to attempt a refutation of Mr. Fry•a id.enti:f'ioa.ti:>n of
straction, formlessness, and demooraoy.

ab-

The reader will

hardly need to be otf ered such a ref'utation.
But the critics a.re not alone to blame.

For, it

what they say is true, the inodarn painters are guilty
one thing surely - the fallacy of primitivism.

ot

To raturn

to primitive art as being best, most essential, and most

expressive is not only unfortunate, but fallacious.

In

this chapter• we have been speaking ot phases of art, which
by the extremas to which they go, bring themselves to our

or!tical attention.

But it is really not such a totally

desperate situation as Fry would have it;

beoaus~

the major-

ity of painting today is still preoocupied with line, space,
and color in a oharaoteristio presentation of interesting ·
top!oa.

The phases, symbolism, cubism, Surrealism and the

like are lwn.poa toGether by the popular mind into "modernistic" a.rt.

These forms we have aoconted are the work of

a minority and exemplify what the present writer would like
to think of as a tangent and not n real growth from the body

ot American art.

These artists a.rat admittedly, too esoterio

to tulfill. the communicative demands of art; and their nrt

will

be~ither

a people's art nor o.n excellent art because

ot this.
.Again, 11' what the critics say is true, we may note
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another peculiarity about this tendency.

Their schools,

ory the modern painters, stem from the findings of Freudian
investigation, and are based on the projection of unconnected
or'curiously

oonne~ted

images and associations.

They also

say that they are giving us a natural art, a real art, an
art that is, above all, expressive.
hardly consistent.

These two claims are

In the first place, it artists had al-

ways had a natural urge to project their dreams as such (for
surely

t~ey

had always had dreams), i.e., if this subcon-

scious art were essential and natural, it would never have
waited for Freud, nor would it have been so extremely and
suddenly precipitated at the same time when every other
phase ot theory was having a Freudian reaction.

This strikes

one as merely a rationalization on the part of these painters,
and points to the general conclusion that the present writer
would like to make• that the extreme art of ,today is large-

ly an affectation.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. SUmmary

We saw, in Socrates, how.the earliest criterion

ot beauty was utility; and how the triad of goodness, truth,
and beauty prevented the isolation ot aesthetics as a separate system.

Plato's scorn ot the arts in general lett

no room at all tor ugliness; and it was Aristotle who tirst
justitied it tor purposes ot realism, and in connection
.

with tragedy and comedy.

.

After Aristotle, then, representa•

tive ugliness was conceded a certain aesthetic value; and
an additional problem ot formal ugliness was emphasized by
Plotinus.

With st. Thomas as the aesthetic synthesis ot

Aristotle, Plotinus, and Augustine, the long period ot early
speculation ends with f0ur possible justifications or ugliness in art:

realism, comed1 and tragedy, ugliness as a toil

to beauty, and the organic notion as in Plotinus.
It was Edmund Burke who toreshadowed Nietzsche's
Dionysian aesthetics by his emphasis on the imagination in
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relation to the experience of Sublimity, whioh was closely
.

'

ugliness~

oonneoted
with
,

Ugliness, he regarded as antithet-

.

ioal- to beauty; but there is new justification
tor it as an
"
'

'

artistic possibility in that it may be redeemed by its capacity to stimulate the

imaginatio~

and the passions.

In Baum-

garten, there
was also a romantic . tendency to exalt the ima•
.
gination.

Kant's rather relativistic position showed an even

wider and·more definite inclusion, in that representative
ugliness was legitimate insotar as it did not excite dis!

gust.

Along with these three romantic thinkers, we discussed

Schiller, tor whom didactic and passionate art was bad; 1n
his works, there seemed to be the heralding ot German ideal-

ism and the emergence ot the concept of aesthetic idealization.
For Schelling, who greatly influenced Hegel, there
was no real ugliness, as there was none for Schopenhauer,
whose oonoept of the ugly was a dialectical antithesis of
beauty,

neo~ssary

,,

.

tor the tull revelation·or the Idea. Ugli-

ness tor Hegel, could be redeemed by beauty: and the emphasis

was upon the inner spiritual reality of things. Follow.ln.g
the dialeotical tendencies of German idealism, two aesthetic
doctrines arose:

the overcoming ot the

of Beauty from Abstract to Concrete.

~gly,

and the Passage

In the light ot these

we discussed Schlegel, Sohasler, and Hartmann who, with Sohelling, emphasized the "characteristic." Ugliness was identified
-

.

with ·the oomio in Bolger, Weisse, Ruge, and again, Hartmann.
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Rosenkranz•s Aesthetic of the Uglz was pointed out as the
most concrete notice of the problem; 'in that work, the author
admitted that ugliness must be aesthetically legitimate

be~

oau'se of 1ts existence outside of art. But he insisted that
ugliness could never claim any independent existence in art. ·
In general, this period was an

import~t

advance because of_

the emphasis put upon inner spiritual reality, and the consequent notion that superficiality was ugly. Also important
is the dialectical use of ugliness with its tendency to deny
absolute ugliness, giving it an inevitable transitional place
in the progress to beauty.
'With Nietzsche, recalling Burke and Kant, we had
.

a new standard.

.

The so-called ugly, in terms ot the evilt

questionable, and terrible, was really evidence of the best
artistic quality and symbolic of power so long as it did not
weaken the superman.

The really ugly was that which sympto-

mized degeneration ot any kind, that which did not develop
the superman.

Bosanquet 1 s real advance lay in his concepts

of easy and difficult beauty, and beauty in the wider and
the narrower sense.

Idealistically, his tendency was to

deny any ugliness, naturally
or artistically; ··but he . indi.
oated that it would exist, it there was such a thing, in the
falsely beautiful, the insincere and affected in art.

There

was nothing particularly new 1n·Bergson, who said that natural
ugliness could be aesthetically treated in comedy; or in
Santayana, who returned to a moral identification of beauty.
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This was likewise seen in Whitehead, who also returned to
a certain extent to the Hegelian dialectical position. of
ugliness.

With Croce and Gentile, we had an original no-

tion or ugliness as unsucoesstul expression.

These last

two thinkers showed the increasing relativism to be seen
in a number or more specialized aestheticians of the modern

period. These additional thinkers were less satisfying than
any group studied because their works wore so largely eclectic. · This chapter ended by pointing out the current critical tendencies towards extreme relativism as illustrated
particularly by Reid
2.

Conclusion

It is customary, when seeking a point

ot

departure

tor a rather unwieldy discussion, to go to )the :diotionary.
1

Funk and Wagpall•s New Standard Dictionary (1938) ,defines

the adjective "ugly" as: displeasing to the esthetic feelings, as from laok of grace, proportion, or adaptation of
parte;· distastetul in appearance; the. reverse ot the beautiful.

Webster's New International Dictionary (1939) says

that ugliness is:

a quality of state ot being ugly;

an instance of this.

al~o,

In aesthetics, ugliness is the opposite

ot beauty. The ugly has, however, been conceded to possess
aesthetic value by various writers, either as being true to
lite and having an intrinsic interest

or

its own., or as
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enhancing beauty by contrast, or as essential to the ·attainment ot unity in variety.
The most immediate reaction to the above definitions is· a desire to repudiate the antithetical position ot
beauty and ugliness.

But the statement or such an antithesis

does indirectly present a consideration whioh is important
tor clarity 1n this discussion:

it is a distinction between

the popular judgment and the more objective judgment which
is based on a recognition ot whatever aesthetic standards
may exist.

or

in terms Which are already familiar to the

reader, it ia really nothing but a distinction between beauty
in the narrow sense and beauty in the wide sense, and closely
connected with Bosanquot's conceptions of easy and difficult
beauty.

For 1n the popular mind and language, it is true

that beauty and ugliness are opposites; subjectively speaking,
ugliness is opposed to the strictly beautiful.
Then what is the problem of ugliness in art?

can

it all be reduced to cases of difficult beauty or to the
category of the aesthetically excellent (beauty in the wide
sense)?

Can it be true that the problem is entirely nominal,
.

.

that "ugly" is a convenient, emotional, impetuous response,
relative· to beauty which is the only existing value in the
case?

What is the problem?

Lockie Parker says that it all

boils down to "whether the presentation of Qbjeots, scenes,
or people that we should not find pleasing in real life oan
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be justified."

1

The pro sent wr1 ter does not find 1 t quite

so simple, nor ao easily·reduoed to a single principle.
us take the problem from a subjective viewpoint.

.

Let.

Clearly,

there are wide divergenoies in the associative capacities
and emotional mechanisms of individuals, whioh divergenoies.

create a number of difterenoes within the judgment rtugly."
1

What is happening when a person, criticizing an art-object,·
exclaims "How uglyl"?

The present v1riter believes the cause

of such a judgment to lie in one or more of the eight follovdng circumstances.

,

Most simply, it may be
in the case
. 1

of representative art, because of the topic, - that the
painter 1s representing an object that is ugly in nature.
It may be a portrait ot an ugly person or it may be a slums
scene.: Secondly, the representation may be judged ugly because it arouses unpleasant or disagreeable associations,
oonso1ously or suboonsciously effective 1n oausine the judgment "ugly."

In the third place, the art-object may give

an exaggerated or modified representation of an object to
which the spectator is somehow attached -- or similarly,
an unrealistic depiction of something the spectator's common
sense lmows should appoar otherwise. . The above three cases
of judgment obviously are not purely aesthetic;
moral.

th~y

may be

However, more clearly moral is the judgment of aesthetic

l. Lockie Parker, .sm,.oit., P• 75.
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ugliness given of an art-object which shows an immoral aot
or porsonalitY' or }\istorioal event.

The titth possible

cause may lie in the tact that the art-object is too unusual, foreign, exotic, 1.e., contrary to conventional
taste.

This may refer.to the subject matter, but most

probably to its arrangement,

or

to the total impression.·

Again, sixth, the total appearance may be too vapid; too'
neutral, or too intense.

Thie is closely connected with

the problem of form; seventh• in Whioh oiroumstanoe the
v1ork may have an apparent lack of form, may be too intricate, or disproportionate formally.

Eighth and finally,

the object may be judged ugly because, according to some'
standard, it is not useful; though it is doubttul that many
minds·actually work quite so pragmatically.
The problem seems to be only widened by such an
analysis, tor it still remains

t~ dete~~

which, 1t any,

ot these judgmento is legitimate, 1.e., which would constitute legitimate standards by which all arts could be judged
by all persons.

Or which ot these judgments wpuld remove the

art-object into the category of difficult beauty?

Or which,

it given in equivalent terms. without speoifio use ot the
word "ugly" would place the art-object in the category of
the aesthetically exoelle1:1t? For,. it
to the strictly beautiful, the

we

consider, .in addition

ohara~teristio,

the expressive,

the s1gn1t1oant, the dramatic, the comic, and the tragic as
types of tine art, then elements of certain so-called ugliness

l.18

will inevitably be admitted within beauty ot the wider meaning.

In short, whioh or the above.eight possible judgments

ot ugliness must \ve dismiss as entirely impulsive and personal

or~ticisms,

tivit~

and which

o~,we

retain as possessing objec-

to the degree that they may form possible standards

of art oritioism?
In the first place, most or tho eight occasions

will be.found to fall right away into the category of difficult beauty, which difficulty is caused, as Bosanquet has
indicated, by unusual degrees . of 1ntriqaoy, tension• and
width. This general position, bec~use it is again now ~t
~

immediate importance to our discussion, is illustrated
by

John Martin:
ttBecause it is the nature of the organism
to defend itself against inharmonious adjustments and to invite harmonious adjustments,
that material is most easily effective which·
awakens pleasurable associations. The clear,
bright·oolor, the soft tone, the gentle modulation; the curved line, the smooth and evertlowing movement, invite no resistance whereas the discordant tone combination, the angular line, the irregular rhythm, the abrupt
attack, arouse defensive and even avertive
reaotions and conflicting adjustments. The
work of art, therefore Which wins the most
the one which deals
widespread popularity
in materials of the easiest reception." 2

ls

He adds, however, that

thos~

art-objects which are,

1n the long ,run, the most momentous and significant are those

2. John Martin, Introduction to the Dance, New York, 1939,
Norton 1 PP• 73-74.
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which require an extension or the receptive conao1ousness.

3

The argument tor the unusual is reintoroed by
Barton:
"The time ha.d come when people began to
argue about 'beauty'; and· what seemed beautiful 1n art• to one person, was thought ugly
by another. Good pa.inters did not theorise

very much in this way. The romantic painter
tried to eXpress a feeling, the realistic
painter tried to catch a truth; and ea.oh, it
he succeeded, produced a work that eventually though it might annoy many peo:ple for the time
being - came to be accepted as an addition to
the catalogue or 'beautiful' pictures." ~
The truth
by

.

or this situation is pushed even turther

Bulley who writes not only that the average person praters

the familiar to the strange but also that, when ugliness is
the rule, Ugliness will be accepted.

5

The eventual acceptance of what were t!rst ugly
pictures is also expressed by Havelock Ellis, who says that
he finds that the value of an artist's work, previously alien
to the sensibility, becomes greatly beautiful atter years ot

contemplation or by a sudden intuition comparable.to a religious conversion.

6

we have been discussing the problem trom the point

ot view ot the spectator, but any answer will be incomplete

3. Ibid., P• 74•
4. J. E. Barton, Purpose· and Admiration: A Lay Study ot the
Visual Arts, New York 1 1933, F. A. Stokes, p. 138.
5. Margaret Bulley, Art and Understandin.S,, London, 1937 1
; B. T. Batsford; P• so.
·
·
6. Havelock Ellis, The Dance of Lite, New York, 1929, Random
House, Modern Library, P• 314.
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unless approached trom. the artist's standpoint also. What
is ugly to the artist? What does !!.!. teel should be excluded?
<

Is there
. ever really a deliberate choice ot what the artist
-.

believes is ugly? A taso1nat1on with ugliness?

In general,

it will be found that the artist wii1 be the most liberal '

ot judges, perhaps because he knows_ what to look for in an.
'

art-object, and 1s educated to what is really good and bad
art.

But the artist is less inclined .to explicit judgment
~

than others, if he is.at all preoccupied with judging, know-

ing possibly that he will be_ judged by the same standards
which he imposes upon the work of someone elae; and all in
all, he is more concerned with

th~

activity of creating than

with the passivity of criticizing.
'

The artist may appear
i

to make a deliberate choice of ugliness, because, as Bulley
says, he is overoonsoious ot the tact that beauty ot art
differs
. widely from natural beauty. He finds (seeks . to
find?) beauty most clearly in what is ugly to others. And,

1n doing so, Bulley says, brings as beauty into art ugliness
.

·7

which we onl1 thought existed.
Buch a choice ot ugliness is clearly not the same .
thing as a fascination with ugliness.

The theoretical prob-

lem of the tascination with ugliness would involve more psychology than it is proper to introduce at this point.

It is
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this w.riterts belief, however, that suoh a phenomenon olear11' exists; and it is an invincible temptation to include
here, in part, the rather allegorical interpretation of
such tasoinntion as is described in The Crook of Gold by

James Stephens.

In

this section on ugliness, the Thin

Woman ot Inis Magrath has come upon three strange men
in the·wooc1s:

"The third man can soaroely be described.
He was neither short nor tall. He was muscled
as heavily as the second man. As he sat he
looked like a colossal toad squatting with his
arms about his knees, and upon these his chin
rested. He had no shape nor swiftness, and
his head was flattened down and was scarcely
wider than his neck. He had a protruding doglike mouth that twitched occasionally, and
from his little eyes there glinted a horrible
intelligence. Before this man the soul of
the Thin Woman grovelled. She felt herself
crawling to him. The last terrible abasement
of which humanity is capable came upon her:
a fascination which would have drawn her to
him in screaming adoration • • • " a

one

or the three men speaks:

"We are the Three Absolutes, the Three
Redeemers, the Three Alembics - the Most
Beautiful Man,, the strongest Man and the
Ugliest Man. In the midst of every strife we
go unhurt • • ~ Beyond us there is no best
man • • • tor we are·the best in beaut1', and
the best in strength, and the best in ugliness;
there is no-excellence which is not contained
in us three." 9
'

e.

James Stephens, The Crook or Gold, London, 1926, l!acmillan,
pp. 290-291.
9. Ibid., PP• 291-293.
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From

the

best !n beauty, strength, and ugliness, the Thin

Woman choosess
"Then to the third man the Thin Woman
addressed herself in terror, tor to that
hideous one something cringed within her
1n an ecstasy ot loathing. · Tb.at repulsion
which at its strongest becomes attraction
gripped her • • • " 10

As allegorical as the foregoing interpretation
is, it is ottered as an illustration ot the peyohologioal
ciroumstanoes.underlying suoh a theoretically possible phe•
nomenon as en extreme taso1nat1on with ugliness on the part

ot the artist.
Still further, before approaching the snythesis

ot the creative and receptive ,standards in which must finally lie our answer 1 we must stop to ask what is the artist,• s
.

aim.

Is _!l beauti?

.

Clear11, the aim ot art, generally

:

speaking, is not an esoteric one; and in the long run, art's
tundamental goals will have. social oonneotions.

We may talce

tor granted that at least part of the artist's total aim is
the desire to create works which will please men.

But is

this aim, in whole or in part, an attempt to create beauty?
The artist's task, believes Barnes, is to "shun
the conventional idealizations which represent

~hings

as

they are habitually oonoeived, and to see things as they

10 • .±!>id. 1 PP• 295-296.
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are in reality."

11

If this is so, does the task not already

predispose the artist to be Judged ugly aooording to what
we have said concerning the weight of the habitual? Barnes
contends that such is the case, for although groat art haa
always been real1st1o, it has always been greeted vdth the
charge ot ugliness and misrepresentation.
"Anarchy• falsity, charlatanism and uglt-,
ness are the stock terms of abuse applied to
every great artist by his ovm generation,
but what those terms really mean is their
exact opposite - that the artist has a grasp
of thinBs more profoundly ordered and so more
beautiful than that current in his day." 12
That the aim of art should be realism is also the
opinion of Eric Gill.
happy", he writes.

"Only in what is real can man be

"The unreal cannot be the true; what

is not true·cannot be good; the radiance of reality turns
out to be the only beauty; safety is valueless except as a
means to enjoyment and, ultimately, reality is alone enjoy•
13
able."
The gist of his entire book is summed up in the.
words• "Look after goodness and truth and beauty will take
. 14

care ot herself."
That the artist does not, or should not, aim at
"beauty" is

~ikewise

the opinion ot Barker, who suggests

11. Albert C• Be.mes, The Art in Paintins, New York, 1928,
Harcourt; Brace, p. zo.
12. Ibid., P• · 35.
13. Erle Gill,,.ru!,_auty L?oks attar Herself, London, 1933 1
Sheed · and ward", p. 209.

Ibid. 1 P• 245.
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"vitality" in its place.

15

Art today must take hold ot

things which are vastly more important than beauty, things
\vhioh even appear to contradict both the word Beauty and
"16

the Beautiful thing itself.

So it seems, finally, that

beauty is enviably, but undeniably, a by-product

or

some-

thing more important.

Previously we attempted to show the strength ot
the usual 1n aeathatio criticism..
aim

or

art, at best, is realistic.

Now

we

indicate that the

These two conditions,

though seemingly harmoni!lUs 1 are often not so, because
artistic realism ls often contrary to habitual conception.
Ugliness as justitied by realism is, nevertheless, accorded

an aesthetic power;

and art-objects whore
such ugliness
.
.

occurs may be, other things being equal, passed into the
realm ot beauty 1n the wide sense of the aesthetically excellent.

Tberotore representational ugliness must be dis-

missed as having no possibility of being real ugliness 1n

an antithetical position to beauty.
Then, we are drawing nearer to a final answer
when we come to the question of the existence ot suoh real
ugliness.

Does it exist, and it so, where?
Mrs. Gilbert, in her Studies in Recent Aesthetic,

15. Virgil Barker, "Is Beauty the Right Word?" in The American
· Mufa.zlne 01' Art, March, 1936 1 P• 177.
16. lb d., p. 177.
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writes: ·
"It is now taken as aesthetic innocence
to apply the word •ugly' to the portraits ·
of \n"inkled old women, cacophony in poetry,
discords 1n music, angularit:r in drawing or
roughness of dramatic utterance. The shrinking from complex and uningrntiating representation, if there 1s·someth1ng pmvertul ottered,
is imputed to the timidity and intellectual
narrowness of the spectator." 17
The tendency, she opines, is to say that nothing is really
ugly; and she suggests that perhaps ugliness has been badly

defined rather than that 1t has no existence.

18

Integrity

ot impression, aha feels, is and will remain the apriori
law ot beauty, but the attainment

or

this can be eubjeot

to no rules.

That ugliness still exists as an infraction
19
of beauty in terms of untused elements, she maintains.

"Any insurmowitable or unmotivated dissonance - between
pretension and tulfillment, artist and product, or detail ..
and totality - seems impossible to justify."

20

It, beonuae ot individual ditterenoee among
judges, we seem to ba driven to a somewhat relativistic
position 1tor there is hardly any art-object that is not
beautiful or expressive to someone), we are rescued from
utter relativism by the common-sense knowledge that there
must be some standards of good and bad, as oonneoted with

17. Katherine Gilbert, Studies in Recent Aesthetic; Chapel
Hill 9 1927, University ot llorth Carolina Press, p. 162. ·

18. Ibid •• p. 163.-

18. Ibid.; P• 166.
20. 'fbl&., p. 167.
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beautiful and. ugly art.

/;.lld 1:1' we agree with Mrs. Oilbert,

we must admit that there remains a very real possibility ot
ugly art.

So far as the strictly beautitul is concerned
(recall that this is not to be equated with easy beauty)•
so-called ugliness in the form

or

representative ugliness

and &1.stortion ot any kind is not admissable.
the strictly beautiful !.!, opposed to the ugly.

In this sense,

But the aes-

thetic realm is tar broader than the strictly beautitul.
The remainder ot the realm is covered by the aesthetically
excellent, or beautiful in the wider sense; and since we
will admit no so-called ugliness into the former category,
it is this latter in which our answer must finally rest.
And the final question seems to be:

under what conditions

are certain types of ugliness Justifiable in this category;
and where does real artistio ugliness begin?
First we must admit representative ugliness tor
purposes of realism, truth, and in connection with the sign1t1oant1 the oharaoteristio e.nd such types.
.

Also, we must
.

admit distortion tor purposes of power, emotional strength,
logical and organic consistency, and so forth.

Possibly the

ugly may be admitted to heighten beauty; and certain other

torms ot the ugly.will be admitted artistically so long as
comedy and tragedy are called art-forms.
Now, if' we l"eturn to our eight possible circumstances
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under which the judgment ugliness may ooaur, we w111·tind ,
that, it we admit ugliness in the above respects, only two

ot our oircumstanoes will retain any legitimacy.

These two

are the total appearance of' an art-object, or its sensuous
appeal in general; and that criterion of f'orm, which is .
concerned with the necessary attributes ct organic unity
•

I

and intelligibility, and with Mrs. Gilbert's problem ot
"unfused elements."

In short, (dismissing the strictly

beautitul)t so-called ugliness, 1n terms or topio end certain distortions, is legitimate.

That ugliness which is

real and not aesthetically legitimate, is in rormal terms

ot unintelligibility and incoherence.
so tar, then, as beauty 1n the wide sense is
concerned, the first category or ugliness cannot be anti-

.

thetioal to beauty because it 1s included in, beauty, and .

is a positive taotor ot aesthetic enjoyment. What we have
judged finally to be real ugliness is, on the other hand,
opposed to beauty 1n that it is negative, a lack ot what
should exist in good art.
Finally, it will be seen that, if these are the
spectator•s demands, they will oo1no1de with the aims of
the artist.
!t he

For whether or not the artist aims at beauty,

!! an artist, he will aim at intelligibility or ex•

pression.

And he will aim at achieving a dynamic quality,

a vitality which will give his work immediate sensuous appeal.
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The final ansv1er. then, lies close to those
Croce and :Mrs. Gilbert.

ot

Real aesthetic ugliness,existsin

the failure of unity of expression, of integrity in impression.

This is simply stated by Mrs. Gilbert when she speaks

of "unfused elements." Any paint1ng or poem or

mlisic~

any

work of any type ot art, which contains an element not justifiable on grounds ot logical consistency, organic unity
and the other justifications we have.indicated, is simply
and purely ugly.

art be required

(Nor should mu.oh analysis ot the work ot
in the effort to tind justif ioatio~; &U~h

art would be too esoteric).
of that art which is

To this extent the qualities

aesthe~ically

good are absolute enough

to be positively formulated and determined in each separate
art.

Therefore, the problem is not

relative.

and

cannot be entirely
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